Theater of Drama and Comedy, Leningrad
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard

the regime and exhorting moral conduct. On the stage, playwrights and actors operated within the party's controlled framework under which themes had to be approved in advance of a performance. Musicians wrote and played only music sanctioned by the regime for public performances. Art galleries displayed works approved by party officials. In the 1980s, however, artists began to express harsh and painful themes in their works, sometimes cutting a fine line between permitted and forbidden subjects. In the post-Brezhnev period, the government vacillated between imposing more restrictive artistic controls and allowing greater freedom of expression. After 1985 the Soviet artistic world experienced a number of contentious debates about the liberties allowed to artists.

Literature

Since the 1930s, the regime has regulated literary expression through socialist realism. In spite of the brief literary thaw during the late 1950s, throughout the Brezhnev period writers endured a reemphasis of Stalinist constraints over their works. Traditional ways of thinking and of viewing history no longer applied to many parts of literature, however, once Gorbachev assumed power.

The ferment inspired a creativity not witnessed since Khrushchev's literary thaw. Books began to treat conflicts faced by real human beings and to portray critical and poignant topics theretofore banned. Poets such as Evgenii Evtushenko and Andrei Voznesenskii, who had receded into the background from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, were again able to express their desire for a more humane society, uncovering the truth about the past and seeking greater freedom for the arts. Previously banned themes began to appear for the first time since the 1920s. Conservative elements persisted in some literary circles, however, and in the late 1980s some bans on literary themes remained in effect.

A limited degree of freer expression on topics dealing with societal changes was permitted between Brezhnev's death and Gorbachev's rise to power. For example, in 1983 Andropov allowed the publication in book form of Chingiz Aitmatov's, *The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years.* In this novel, Aitmatov, a native of the Kirgiz Republic, confronts such historical themes as the brutal Stalinist period, social and moral turpitude, and nationality tensions in the Soviet Union. In the novel, he treats tensions between Russians and non-Russians from a Central Asian perspective. This book, however, stands alone.

Chernenko reintroduced strict bans on critical and innovative works. One example concerns Sergei Zalygin's (editor in chief of *Novyi mir*) novel *After the Storm,* which appeared shortly after

Chernenko's death. During Chernenko's rule, the second half of the novel had been withheld from publication without explanation.

Under Gorbachev, literary treatment of such topics as alcohol and drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, religious subjects (including references to God), historical reassessments of previous leaders, and even harsh criticisms of past leaders have been approved, provided they contained the prescribed amount of support for the regime. Yet in the late 1980s, editors continued to uphold the party creed to prevent works containing unsanctioned views from reaching the public. In 1988 books almost never contained material on or made reference to "anti-Soviet émigrés" or defectors, anticommunist foreign literature, pornographic topics, or "underground" works—referred to as samizdat (see Glossary) if self-published in the country or *tamizdat* if published abroad.

Gorbachev's policy of openness also contributed to more lively discussions among members of the Union of Writers. Controversy erupted at the Eighth Congress of the Union of Writers during the summer of 1986, where the majority of speeches centered on hotly disputed topics. Speeches by Voznesenskii and Evtushenko criticized the neglect shown by the regime toward some of the Soviet Union's most talented writers, and they advocated support for publication of their works. Thus, by 1988 the journal *Novyi mir* had published Pasternak's novel *Doctor Zhivago* in four installments. In addition, at Voznesenskii's behest, the Union of Writers approved the selection of such nondelegates as the famous poet Bella Akhmadulina, the writer and balladeer Bulat Okudzhava, and the firebrand writer Iurii Chernichenko to membership on the union's administrative board. Finally, the writers' congress witnessed the changing of the guard as Vladimir Karpov, a survivor of Stalinist labor camps, replaced the conservative Georgii Markov as first secretary of the Union of Writers.

At the congress, ethnic confrontations also arose between Russian and non-Russian authors; opposition was voiced against bureaucratic publishing roadblocks; and vehement demands were made favoring a reevaluation of Soviet history. Conservative views, however, also appeared. Sergei Mikhalkov, the first secretary of the Russian Republic's writers' union and a declared opponent of Gorbachev's openness policy, cautioned against "parasites" who lack a direct relation to literature and others who espouse overly liberal views. In addition, Nikolai Gribachev, a conservative writer, advocated a return to "classic Soviet writers," especially Maksim Gor'kiy, associated with "proletarian populism," and Aleksei N. Tolstoi, a supporter of "Russian nationalism." The conservatives highlighted the importance of nationalism and the legacy of socialist

realism's emphasis on the "positive hero." Nationalistic defenses prompted another conservative writer, Aleksandr Prokhanov, to criticize the emergence of the "new social type" of individual in literature, an ideologically apathetic citizen overly sympathetic to the West.

Nevertheless, at the Eighth Congress of the Union of Writers, the liberals gained ground and secured a number of dramatic changes. After much lobbying by prominent writers and poets, including Evtushenko and Voznesenskii, the liberal and conservative elements of the writers' union reached agreement in mid-1988 to turn Peredelkino, Pasternak's former home, into an official museum. The Eighth Congress also served as a harbinger for loosening the censorship restrictions on the publication of several politically charged novels. Among these works were Anatolii Rybakov's penetrating *Children of the Arbat,* which offered insights into the origins of Stalinism, and Vasilii Grossman's *Life and Fate,* which drew historical comparison between Stalinism and Nazism. The late 1980s ushered in the way for poet Tat'iana Tolstaia, the granddaughter of the Soviet writer Aleksei Tolstoi (1882–1945), to publish. Known for her dramatic realism about death in ordinary people's lives, Tolstaia saw her publications appear in *Oktiabr'* and *Novyi mir* and won great acclaim, even though the Union of Writers continued to exclude her.

Cinema

A long tradition of classic and monumental films created by film makers such as Sergei Eisenstein served the regime's intent of portraying a strong socialist society (see Society and Culture in the 1920s, ch. 2). The party dictated the themes and issues that Soviet film makers would depict.

In the late 1980s, the film industry underwent dramatic changes as the CPSU allowed film makers to analyze social dilemmas and propose remedies. From 1986 to 1988, three important developments occurred within the film-making leadership. First, film makers banded together to remove conservative bureaucrats from the Union of Cinematographers and to replace them with younger, bolder, and more innovative directors. Second, these changes led to the formation of the Disputes Committee within the union headed by an important, more open-minded *Pravda* critic in order to examine approximately sixty films that had been "withheld" without any proper justification. Among these prohibited films were three directed by the new head of the Union of Cinematographers, Elem Klimov. Third, the official state organ controlling cinema, Goskino, was forced to yield to an ever-increasing number of union

Home of poet and novelist Boris Pasternak, southwest of Moscow in the writers' colony at Peredelkino
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard

demands for greater cinematic freedom. Previously, film makers who wanted to produce films were required to please Goskino and the censors. Box office success was unimportant. In the late 1980s, film makers won the right to have their films judged on their merits. As a result, success for film makers meant producing money-making ventures. They no longer required the full professional and financial support of Goskino.

The CPSU Central Committee also reduced the power and influence of the Ministry of Culture's Glavrepertkom (see Glossary), the official film-release control apparatus. By the end of 1986, many previously banned or withheld films were showing in movie theaters. Yet as of 1988, Glavrepertkom continued to wield substantial censorship influence, with its reach extending to theaters, circuses, concerts, phonograph records, and general musical productions.

One of the most adventuresome film makers was a seasoned film professional, Iulii Raizman. Born in 1903, Raizman survived many tribulations during the oppressive eras of Soviet film making. He poignantly explored such themes as family trauma, societal immorality, materialism and corruption, and economic deprivation. His *Private Life* (1982) explores the ordeals of a factory manager who, when forced into retirement, realizes that he has sacrificed time with his family. *A Time of Wishes* (1984) examines how women

endure their inferior lot in society. Raizman has gained such renown, particularly as head of Mosfilm studios in Moscow, that he has been able to initiate the production of progressive films and has supported efforts of younger, aspiring, and creative film makers to voice their concerns through their works.

The relaxation of controls over film making has also permitted the release of numerous films that had been restricted for many years. Four such prominent films released were Klimov's *Agoniia* and *Come and See,* Aleksei German's *My Friend Ivan Lapshin,* and Tengiz Abuladze's *Repentance.* Known in the West as *Rasputin,* Klimov's *Agoniia* presents a more balanced view of Tsar Nicholas II than that historically taught in the school systems, and it also contains religious overtones. The film maintains an unusual silence regarding the Bolshevik Revolution. Klimov completed *Agoniia* in 1975, but it was not released until 1985. In *Come and See,* Klimov captures the horrors of war from a typical Soviet perspective, that of destruction symbolized not only by the Nazi genocide but also by the premonition of nuclear holocaust.

The other two films deal with some of the horrors of the Stalin period. German's *My Friend Ivan Lapshin,* which required three years for approval after it had been completed, contains an investigation said to depict innocent people being persecuted during Stalin's reign of terror. Abuladze's *Repentance* created a stir throughout the Soviet Union as well as the outside world. Written in 1982, produced in 1984, and approved for public viewing in 1987, *Repentance* concentrates on the crimes of the Stalin era and the evil involved in the arrests of innocent people, some of whom were later executed. The dictator portrayed supposedly is based on a number of evil men in recent history, the most important of whom are Stalin and his secret police chief, Lavrenty Beria. Echoes of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini are also evident in the dictator's appearance. Not only was the film viewed as an overt attack on Stalinism but it also was intended to shock Soviet citizens and raise their political consciousness to prevent a recurrence of these horrors. Evtushenko has likened the film to "the cultural event of Gorbachev's cultural thaw, just as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* represented the spiritual acme of the Khrushchev era." As Gorbachev stressed in a speech on the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in a 1987 Central Committee plenum, such films are more openly watched in a society encouraged to reassess itself and ensure that "no forgotten names and no blank pages . . . of the years of industrialization and collectivization" be left untouched.

Taganka Theater, Moscow. The Taganka was founded in 1964 by the director Iurii Liubimov; Vladimir Vysotskii performed here until his death in 1980.
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard

Theater

Soviet citizens have a rich cultural heritage in theater. Two of the most internationally famous theaters, Moscow's Bolshoi Theater and Leningrad's Kirov Theater, attracted both domestic and foreign audiences with striking performances in huge, ornate, and festive halls. The performers who played to sold-out performances in these theaters and who adhered to the regime's acting and directing guidelines received special benefits such as worldwide travel, luxurious apartments, and the highest state honors for their artistic contributions. Those artists, however, who chose to portray views opposed to the regime's artistic standards experienced shame and denunciation, even though audiences often admired them.

Such an artist was Vladimir Vysotskii. In his short lifetime, Vysotskii attracted widespread popularity but railed against a system he opposed. Although he died in 1980 of a heart attack, apparently the result of alcoholism, Vysotskii's mass appeal became in many ways more pervasive after his death. His memory evolved into a veritable cult, with thousands of people mourning the anniversaries of his death by filing past his burial place. This balladeer

and actor, who for years played such famous roles as Hamlet under the tutelage of Taganka Theater director Iurii Liubimov, raised the avant-garde theater to a cultural pinnacle in Moscow by attracting thousands of followers, even for unannounced or unpublicized programs that featured his protests, often against the leadership's failings. His poetry and music, once banned in the Soviet Union, have been disseminated throughout the country and depict bureaucratic corruption, elitism, poverty, war, and prison camp horror. In the late 1980s, Vysotskii's mentor, Liubimov, continued to leave an indelible mark on the theater, even after his forced exile by the authorities and the bans on his productions. He lived abroad and continued to produce masterpieces adapted from Gor'kiy's novel *Mother,* Bertold Brecht's play *The Good Woman of Szechuan,* Mikhail Bulgakov's novel *The Master and Margarita,* and Fedor Dostoevskii's novel *Crime and Punishment,* making him the greatest Soviet theatrical director. The Taganka Theater performed without him, but the stage did not retain the same popularity. Under Gorbachev, Liubimov was allowed back to his homeland to direct his version of the opera *Boris Godunov,* banned in 1983 when he was forced to leave the Soviet Union. However, Liubimov remained only long enough to oversee the project's completion and left of his own accord, preferring to live abroad.

After 1985 a degree of liberalization similar to that permitted for literature and cinema prevailed for the stage. In 1985 and 1986, approximately 10 percent of the directors were replaced in favor of younger and more innovative directors, who, in turn, opened the door to more creative playwrights. In addition, theater groups (collectives) gained "full independence in the selection of plays," releasing them in some measure from the onus of the regime's authoritarian and arbitrary decisions. As a result of these changes, playwrights such as Mikhail Shatrov blossomed within the freer theater environment. In 1986 his "neo-Leninist" work *Dictatorship of Conscience,* which portrayed Stalin and Brezhnev as shady and sometimes unfaithful communists, played to receptive audiences. Shatrov's other prominent play from the 1987–88 period, . . . *Further* . . . *Further, and Further!,* offered a scathing indictment of the Stalin period, this time concentrating on Lenin's legacy and the way Stalin manipulated the other Bolshevik leaders during the 1920s in his successful effort to defeat them. Shatrov captured the characters of many early revolutionary leaders, using strong dialogue to depict vivid conflicts.

Music

The Soviet Union has produced some of the world's foremost

Grave of Vladimir Vysotskii
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard

composers and musicians. The authorities, however, have sought to control their music as well as their performances. As a result, composers struggled to produce their works under strict limitations. Some artists emigrated, but their works endured and continued to attract large audiences when performed.

Restrictions on what musicians played and where they performed often caused artists to leave the country either of their own accord or through forced exile. Great composers and musicians such as Dmitrii Shostakovich, Mstislav Rostropovich, and Vladimir Fel'tsman were persecuted, and some ultimately emigrated. In 1986, however, Moscow and Leningrad audiences were privileged to hear several memorable performances by the brilliant pianist Vladimir Horowitz, who left the Soviet Union in 1925 and who previously had not been allowed to reenter the country. A composer who decided to remain in the Soviet Union was Alfred Schnittke, acclaimed as the best Soviet composer since Shostakovich and a formidable technician of surrealist expression. Although at times he was restricted by the authorities to presenting unoriginal and party-line works, Schnittke attracted both avant-garde and mainstream audiences because of his original, deeply spiritual, and often mystical compositions. When not confined by the regime to recording certain compositions, Schnittke created such masterpieces as (K)ein Sommernachtstraum, Concerto No. 4 for Violin and Orchestra,

Concerto Grosso No. 1, and Concerto Grosso No. 2, which appealed to audiences around the world.

In addition to classical music, jazz endured and survived the official denunciations the government had cast upon it over the years. The regime distrusted this form of music because it had originated in the United States and because its essence was improvisation. As a symbol of artistic freedom and individual expression, jazz was difficult to control. In the late 1960s and 1970s, jazz was one of the most popular forms of music in the Soviet Union. Such famous jazz artists as Vadim Mustafa-Zadek and Aleksei Kozlov became music idols to a generation of jazz lovers. In the late 1980s, however, the popularity of jazz declined because of the emergence of rock and roll.

The rhythms and sounds of rock and roll appealed mainly to the young. In the 1980s, the popularity of the once leading rock bands Winds of Change and The Time Machine faded in favor of younger groups. Leningrad rock groups such as Boris Grebenshchikov's band Aquarium and the group Avia, which incorporated slogans, speeches, loud sounds, unorthodox mixtures of instruments, and screams, provided an important outlet for youth. Some of their music supported themes along the lines of Gorbachev's policies, expressing a desire for change in society. Rock-and-roll lyrics sometimes exceeded the boundaries of the politically permissible. Yet, the leadership realized that this music could not be eliminated or even censored for long because it not only appealed to many citizens but also could help disseminate the leadership's policies.

For many youth, rock and roll served as a means to live out dreams and desires that might not be possible in daily life. Aspiring rock or popular musicians expressed themselves publicly in the more open political environment during the late 1980s. In that period, Moscow and Leningrad permitted performances of music by *punki* (punk fans) and *metallisti* (heavy metal fans), whose loud, raucous music appealed to alienated and rebellious youth. Most rock music, however, portrayed the artist as explorer and expressed the desire for new styles and forms.

Painting, Sculpture, and the Graphic Arts

Moscow and Leningrad housed the two most popular art museums in the Soviet Union, the Tret'iakov Gallery and the Hermitage Museum, respectively. The Tret'iakov contained medieval and modern Russian masterpieces; the Hermitage's collection of Impressionist painters was one of the best in the world.

Until the mid-1980s, avant-garde expression appeared not in state museums but within the confines of the basement galleries on Moscow's Malaia Gruzinskaia street. Displays of overtly religious, surrealist, or semiabstract works began in 1978. The artists who created such works became an integral part of the cultural life of Moscow, as their art directly contrasted with socialist realism. These "survivalists" withstood pressure from the official unions and prospered through domestic and foreign patronage from established cultural figures, influential higher officials, scientists, and diplomats.

Nonconformist artists created attention both at home and abroad in the late 1980s. Former underground artists, such as Il'ia Kabakov and Vladimir Iankilevskii, were permitted to display their works in the late 1980s, and they captured viewers' imagination with harsh criticism of the Soviet system. Paintings by such artists as Vadim Sacharov and Nikolai Belianiv, linoleum graphic works by Dshamil Mufid-Zade and Maya Tabaka, wood engravings by Dmitrii Bisti, and sculpture by Dmitrii Shilinski depicted society as gray, drab, harsh, and colorless. Their works indicted industrialization, the Great Terror (see Glossary), the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the polluted environment.

Gorbachev based much of his policies' success on the new content of artistic expression appearing throughout the Soviet Union. By opening up cultural life and enabling mass media representatives and artists to speak more honestly, the leadership attempted to win the support of the intelligentsia for its policies. In the late 1980s, the leadership loosened the strictures of socialist realism to enrich the cultural vitality of society, although censorship laws still prevented much information from reaching the public. Although strictures were relaxed, the principle of party control remained in force.

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Many works offer insights into Soviet mass media and culture. For a good overview of the mass media and descriptions of the censorship institutions, the following sources are particularly helpful: Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington's *Politics in the USSR;* Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan R. Dassin's *Press Control Around the World;* Vadim Medish's *The Soviet Union;* Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson's "The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR"; and Ellen Mickiewicz's *Media and the Russian Public.* More specialized works concentrating on media and culture include Maurice Friedberg's *Russian Culture in the 1980s;* Martin Ebon's *The Soviet Propaganda Machine;* Ellen

Mickiewicz's "Political Communication and the Soviet Media System"; Wilson P. Dizard and Blake S. Swensrud's *Gorbachev's Information Revolution;* Valery S. Golovskoy and John Rimberg's *Behind the Soviet Screen;* and S. Frederick Starr's *Red and Hot.* (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 10. Foreign Policy

Ronald W. Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev

ONCE A PARIAH DENIED DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION by most countries, the Soviet Union had official relations with the majority of the nations of the world by the late 1980s. The Soviet Union also had progressed from being an outsider in international organizations and negotiations to being one of the arbiters of Europe's fate after World War II. In the 1970s, after the Soviet Union achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States, it perceived its own involvement as essential to the solution of any major international problem. The Soviet Union's effort to extend its influence or control over many states and peoples has resulted in the formation of a world socialist system (see Glossary) of states whose citizens included some one-fourth of humanity. In addition, since the early 1970s the Soviet Union has concluded friendship and cooperation treaties with a number of Third World states. For all these reasons, Soviet foreign policy is of major importance to the noncommunist world and helps determine the tenor of international relations.

Although myriad bureaucracies have been involved in the formation and execution of Soviet foreign policy, the major policy guidelines have been determined by the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The foremost objectives of Soviet foreign policy have been the maintenance and enhancement of national security and the maintenance of hegemony over Eastern Europe. Relations with the United States and Western Europe have also been of major concern to Soviet foreign policy makers, and relations with individual Third World states have been at least partly determined by the proximity of each state to the Soviet border and to Soviet estimates of its strategic significance. Despite domestic economic problems, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who became general secretary in 1985, has emphasized increased Soviet participation in international organizations and negotiations, the pursuit of arms control and other international agreements, and the reinvigoration of diplomatic, political, cultural, and scientific initiatives in virtually every region of the world.

Ideology and Objectives

According to Soviet theorists, the basic character of Soviet foreign policy was set forth in Vladimir I. Lenin's Decree on Peace, adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets in November 1917. It set forth the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy, which encompasses

both proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence. On the one hand, proletarian internationalism refers to the common cause of the working classes of all countries in struggling to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to establish communist regimes. Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, refers to measures to ensure relatively peaceful government-to-government relations with capitalist states. Both policies can be pursued simultaneously: "Peaceful coexistence does not rule out but presupposes determined opposition to imperialist aggression and support for peoples defending their revolutionary gains or fighting foreign oppression."

The Soviet commitment in practice to proletarian internationalism has declined since the founding of the Soviet state, although this component of ideology still has some effect on current formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy. Although pragmatic *raisons d'état* undoubtedly accounted for much of contemporary Soviet foreign policy, the ideology of class struggle (see Glossary) still played a role in providing a worldview and certain loose guidelines for action in the 1980s. Marxist-Leninist (see Glossary) ideology reinforces other characteristics of political culture that create an attitude of competition and conflict with other states.

The general foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union were formalized in a party program (see Glossary) ratified by delegates to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February-March 1986. According to the program, "the main goals and guidelines of the CPSU's international policy" included ensuring favorable external conditions conducive to building communism in the Soviet Union; eliminating the threat of world war; disarmament; strengthening the "world socialist system"; developing "equal and friendly" relations with "liberated" [Third World] countries; peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries; and solidarity with communist and revolutionary-democratic parties, the international workers' movement, and national liberation struggles.

Although these general foreign policy goals were apparently conceived in terms of priorities, the emphasis and ranking of the priorities have changed over time in response to domestic and international stimuli. After Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, for instance, some Western analysts discerned in the ranking of priorities a possible de-emphasis of Soviet support for national liberation movements. Although the emphasis and ranking of priorities were subject to change, two basic goals of Soviet foreign policy remained constant: national security (safeguarding CPSU rule through internal control and the maintenance of adequate military forces) and, since the late 1940s, influence over Eastern Europe.

Many Western analysts have examined the way Soviet behavior in various regions and countries supports the general goals of Soviet foreign policy. These analysts have assessed Soviet behavior in the 1970s and 1980s as placing primary emphasis on relations with the United States, which is considered the foremost threat to the national security of the Soviet Union. Second priority was given to relations with Eastern Europe (the European members of the Warsaw Pact—see Appendix B) and Western Europe (the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO). Third priority was given to the littoral or propinquitous states along the southern border of the Soviet Union: Turkey (a NATO member), Iran, Afghanistan, China, Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and Japan. Regions near to, but not bordering, the Soviet Union were assigned fourth priority. These included the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Last priority was given to sub-Saharan Africa, the islands in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and Latin America, except insofar as these regions either provided opportunities for strategic basing or bordered on strategic naval straits or sea lanes. In general, Soviet foreign policy was most concerned with superpower relations (and, more broadly, relations between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact), but during the 1980s Soviet leaders pursued improved relations with all regions of the world as part of its foreign policy objectives (see fig. 14).

Foreign Policy Making and Execution

The Foreign Policy Makers

The predominant Soviet foreign policy actor has been the general secretary of the CPSU. The dominant decision-making body has been the Politburo (see Politburo; Secretariat, ch. 7). Although the general secretary is only one of several members of the Politburo, his positions as head of the Secretariat and the Defense Council (see Glossary) gave him preeminence in the Politburo.

Other members of the Politburo also have had major foreign policy-making responsibilities, most notably the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, the chairman of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti—KGB), and the chief of the CPSU's International Department. The minister of defense and the minister of foreign affairs had been full or candidate members of the Politburo intermittently since 1917. The chairman of the KGB became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1967 and has generally been a full member since then. The chief

of the International Department became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1972 but from 1986 to 1988 held only Secretariat membership. Since late 1988, he has been a candidate, then full member of the Central Committee. Even when foreign policy organizations were not directly represented on the Politburo, they were nonetheless supervised by Politburo members.

It is incorrect to say that there are no policy differences within the Politburo or no policy inputs or alterations of policy by other foreign policy actors. One Western theory holds that foreign policy innovation occurs when a new general secretary consolidates his power and is able to implement his policy agenda. It is also apparent that the foreign and domestic environments affect the formulation and execution of Soviet foreign policy. According to some Western theorists, for instance, Soviet opportunism in the Third World in the 1970s owed something to American preoccupation with domestic concerns following the end of the war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. Similarly, the "Reagan Doctrine" of assisting anticommunist insurgencies has been suggested by some Western analysts as contributing to Soviet reassessment of the long-term viability of some Third World revolutionary democratic regimes. The extent to which human, economic, and military resources are available for diplomatic, foreign aid, and military activities also affects Soviet foreign policy. It is nevertheless true that the centralization of foreign policy decision making in the Politburo and the longevity of its members (a major factor in the Politburo's lengthy institutional memory) both have contributed to the Soviet Union's ability to plan foreign policy and guide its long-term implementation with a relative singleness of purpose lacking in pluralistic political systems.

Departments of the Central Committee

Several departments of the Central Committee had some responsibility for foreign policy in the 1980s, including the International Department and the Propaganda Department, which was absorbed by the Ideological Department in 1988. Until late 1988, when the departments were reorganized, the Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries Department and the Cadres Abroad Department also had foreign policy responsibilities. These two departments, originally part of the International Department, were apparently reincorporated into the revamped International Department. From 1978 to 1986, there existed another department involved in foreign policy execution, the International Information Department.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, Washington, 1988, 132–33.

Figure 14. Soviet Foreign Relations Worldwide, 1988

The International Department, created in 1943 essentially to carry out functions previously performed by the Third Communist International (Comintern—see Glossary), was responsible for CPSU relations with nonruling communist parties in other states. Under Boris Ponomarev, chief of the International Department from 1955 to 1986, the International Department focused mainly on CPSU relations with Third World communist and radical parties, but under Anatolii Dobrynin, appointed chief in 1986, the focus included overall party and state relations with developed Western states. In late 1988, Valentin A. Falin, an expert on Western Europe and a professional propagandist, was appointed chief.

The International Department, in focusing on party-to-party relations, had traditionally been involved in supplying various resources to the nonruling parties. These included funds, propaganda, and training. The International Department also had received international delegations from communist and leftist groups while the Soviet government was maintaining correct relations with the home government in power. Finally, the International Department acquired international support for Soviet foreign policy through extensive use of international front groups, such as the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, which were funded and controlled through Soviet parent organizations.

In late 1988, two other departments dealing with foreign policy were reincorporated into the International Department. The Liaison Department, created in 1957 as a spin-off from the International Department, had responsibility for CPSU relations with ruling communist parties in Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Romania, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. The Cadres Abroad Department, created in 1950, approved foreign travel of virtually all Soviet citizens, except for tourists visiting the Warsaw Pact states and military personnel.

The International Information Department, disestablished in 1980, had been created by Leonid I. Brezhnev to consolidate and improve upon propaganda efforts undertaken by the International Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Propaganda Department. It regularly held press briefings for foreign media personnel in Moscow. Its functions were reabsorbed by the International Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Propaganda Department; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reassumed responsibility for press briefings on major policy issues.

Higher State and Government Organizations

In accordance with the 1977 Constitution and the amendments

and additions promulgated in December 1988, several organizations were involved in the formation of foreign policy, including the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers. This influence was primarily a result of the membership of high-ranking CPSU officials in these bodies, which had a limited ability to select and interpret information passed on to the party leadership.

The Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet

The changes to the Constitution adopted in December 1988 altered the character of the Soviet legislative system (see Supreme Soviet, ch. 8). The changes invested the Congress of People's Deputies with "defining the basic guidelines" of foreign policy and expressly assigned foreign policy duties to the newly created position of chairman of the Supreme Soviet. The role of the Supreme Soviet in formulating and overseeing the execution of foreign policy was theoretically strengthened by providing for lengthy (six- to eight-month) yearly sittings of the Supreme Soviet. The duties assigned to the Supreme Soviet included forming the Defense Council, appointing the senior commanders of the armed forces, ratifying international treaties, proclaiming a state of war, and making decisions on the use of troops abroad. This latter provision was added to the list of duties of the Supreme Soviet, as explained by Gorbachev and other leaders, because of the closed nature of the decision process that led to committing troops to the invasion of Afghanistan. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was assigned responsibility for minor diplomatic functions and declaring war in periods when the Supreme Soviet was not in session. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet was to represent the Soviet Union in foreign relations with other states. He was also to submit reports on foreign policy to the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, head the Defense Council, and negotiate and sign international treaties. A Foreign Affairs Committee was also set up and its members empowered to formulate and oversee foreign policy execution. The new legislative structures apparently provided for greater legislative oversight of foreign policy execution and even for some input into the foreign policy formulation process, with the chairman and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet playing a guiding role in foreign policy activities.

The Council of Ministers and Its Presidium

The Presidium of the Council of Ministers also had foreign policy duties in its role as head of the executive branch of the government. The 1977 Constitution specified that the Council of Ministers

be elected at a joint session of the Supreme Soviet and be constitutionally accountable to the Supreme Soviet (see Administrative Organs, ch. 8). The foreign policy duties of the Council of Ministers were not specified in the 1977 Constitution, beyond a general statement that the council was to "provide general direction in regard to relations with other states, foreign trade, and economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation of the Soviet Union with other countries; take measures to ensure fulfillment of the Soviet Union's international treaties; and ratify and repudiate international agreements." These duties were carried out by the various ministries and state committees involved in the execution of foreign policy. The chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, as head of government, met with foreign delegations and signed international trade and economic agreements.

In 1989 three ministries and a committee had foreign policy responsibilities: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (diplomatic relations), the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (trade and arms transfers), the Ministry of Defense (military advisory assistance, use and display of military power abroad, and covert activities through the Main Intelligence Directorate—see Glossary), and the KGB (covert activities through the First Chief Directorate). Many other ministries and state committees and government agencies also had a role in foreign policy execution. These ranged from the Soviet Copyright Agency, which approved foreign requests for reproduction and translation of Soviet media materials, to the State Committee for Foreign Tourism, of which Inturist was a part.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had responsibility for administering the diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union. Once the Council of Ministers had approved diplomatic recognition of a state, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would establish embassies and consulates, provide the core staffs serving abroad, and serve as a conduit for formal communications between the Soviet political leadership and the host state. A Soviet ambassador serving abroad would be regarded under international law as the personal representative of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet to the head of government of the host state. In practice, the Soviet diplomatic service carried out CPSU policy as set forth by the general secretary and the Politburo.

The Bolshevik Revolution (see Glossary) of 1917 resulted in a virtually complete break in diplomatic staffing from the tsarist period because the majority of tsarist diplomatic personnel refused to work for the Bolsheviks. Another discontinuity in staffing occurred in

the late 1930s, when the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (known after 1946 as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was purged and the resulting vacancies filled by young, professionally trained and politically reliable personnel such as Andrei Gromyko. The ministry experienced continuity in personnel and structure throughout Gromyko's tenure as minister (1957–85). Eduard Shevardnadze, who succeeded Gromyko as foreign minister in 1985, reorganized the ministry and made major personnel changes among the Collegium members and ambassadors.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was organized into geographical and functional departments and administrations reflecting Soviet ideological and pragmatic concerns with various geographical regions or world problems. Departments and administrations of the ministry included geographical ones, dealing with the regions of Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and functional ones, dealing with such concerns as international organizations and cultural affairs. Shevardnadze restructured some of the geographical and functional departments, mainly by grouping countries into categories reflecting modern world realities. For example, he grouped communist countries into Asian and European departments, put the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations into a single department, and created another African office consisting almost entirely of the "frontline states" proximal to South Africa.

Instruments of Influence

The Soviet Union interacted with other countries in a variety of ways, including diplomacy, arms transfers, state and government visits, use of communist parties abroad, front organizations, trade and aid, and educational exchanges. To achieve its general and regional foreign policy objectives, the Soviet Union made great efforts to sustain and increase relations over time. The Soviet physical and material presence in a state (which could be quantified by numbers of military and economic advisers and the amount of economic and military assistance) had traditionally been one indicator that, along with information about internal decision making, allowed Western analysts to theorize about the degree of Soviet influence on a particular state's foreign policy.

Diplomatic Relations

The Soviet Union perceived two basic forms of diplomacy: "bourgeois diplomacy" as developed by the European states, with its emphasis on state-to-state relations; and communist diplomacy of a "new type" among the ruling communist and socialist-oriented

Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, Moscow
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard

regimes. Communist diplomacy emphasizes "equal, non-exploitative" party and state relations among the regime and "peaceful coexistence" between these regimes and the capitalist and capitalist-oriented states. Soviet diplomacy hence was multifaceted, embracing state-to-state relations with Western and Western-oriented Third World states; party-to-party ties with ruling and nonruling communist and leftist parties and national liberation groups; state representation in myriad international organizations and at international forums; and political alliances with "fraternal socialist" states and states of socialist orientation through the vehicle of treaties of friendship and cooperation (see Ideology and Objectives, this ch.).

As the prospects for world revolution faded in the first years after the establishment of Bolshevik rule in Russia, the Russian Republic began assiduously to pursue diplomatic recognition as a means of achieving legitimacy. At first, the Russian Republic had resident embassies in only a few countries. After the Soviet Union was established in December 1922—joining the Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian soviet socialist republics—the new state continued the policy of pursuing diplomatic recognition. The Soviet Union was particularly interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States. In 1924 the newly elected Labour Party government in Britain recognized the Soviet Union (in 1927 the succeeding Conservative Party government broke off relations, but they were permanently restored in 1929), and in 1933 the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. During World War II, many Allied states recognized the Soviet Union. During the "Cold War" of the late 1940s and 1950s, many states were wary of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and a few states, mostly in Central America and South America, recalled their accredited representatives. Since the general improvement in East-West relations in the 1960s, however, states in all regions of the world have moved to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Since the 1960s, the Soviet Union has achieved diplomatic relations with states in several regions where such relations were previously unknown or uncommon—South America, Central America, islands in the Pacific, and states in the Persian Gulf region. The range and scope of the Soviet diplomatic presence has been roughly matched only by that of the United States. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union had resident ambassadors in almost 120 states and consulates and trade offices in scores of states. The Soviet Union also tried to maintain or reestablish relations, or exchange ambassadors, with states that had exhibited hostility toward the Soviet

Union, such as China, Egypt, and Somalia. As of 1988, the Soviet Union had refused to establish relations, or had broken off relations, with only a few states, most notably Chile, Paraguay, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Taiwan, and Israel. Soviet diplomatic recognition of the governments of the latter three states had been opposed by other regional powers with which the Soviet Union has wished to maintain or foster close relations (North Korea with respect to South Korea, China with respect to Taiwan, and the Middle Eastern Arab states with respect to Israel).

Party and State Visits Abroad

An important component of Soviet foreign relations was Soviet state and party delegation visits to states with which the Soviet Union enjoyed diplomatic relations. These visits served to improve relations with Western states by influencing elite and popular attitudes. The visits also helped cement and sustain close ties with communist states, states with a socialist orientation, and nonaligned nations. Common actions were often discussed with such states, for example, coordinated voting on United Nations (UN) resolutions. Economic, scientific, cultural, and other cooperation agreements were also signed during these visits, although such agreements were more commonly signed during visits by Third World delegations to Moscow. These visits usually concluded with the publication of joint communiqués that might reveal details of the nature of the visit and also list points of agreement on issues such as the prevention of nuclear war, nuclear-free zones, peaceful coexistence, and anti-imperialism.

Friendship and Cooperation Treaties

In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union began to formalize relations with several Third World states through the signing of friendship and cooperation treaties (see table 29, Appendix A). These treaties were aimed at regularizing economic, political, and military contacts between the Soviet Union and Third World states over extended periods (usually twenty years). Third World regimes signed these treaties to obtain help in the consolidation of their rule or to secure advantage over or protection from regional opponents. All the treaties contained military cooperation provisions or provisions calling for "mutual consultations" in case of security threats to either party. The Soviet Union proffered these treaties in order to consolidate and build on existing relations in the context of an overarching agreement. The Soviet goal has been to encourage close, long-term relations with the Soviet Union. These relations

have included military cooperation and the establishment of Soviet military facilities in some Third World states.

Communist Parties Abroad

By 1984 the Soviet Union had recognized communist and workers' parties in ninety-five countries. Fifteen of these were ruling communist parties. The Soviet Union considered these most ideologically mature parties as part of the world socialist system. The select group included the ruling parties of Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Besides these ruling parties, the Soviet Union perceived other less ideologically mature ruling parties as "Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties," a label that distinguished them from "true" communist parties. These vanguard parties existed in several Third World "revolutionary democracies," which have included Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Nonruling communist parties (of greater or lesser ideological maturity) that existed in developed capitalist and in Third World states "on the capitalist path of development" made up another category of parties.

Lenin founded the Comintern in 1919 to guide the activities of communist parties and communist front organizations abroad. The Comintern's first act was a manifesto urging workers abroad to support the Bolshevik regime in Russia. Later, the Comintern became a tool the Soviet Union used to direct foreign communist parties to execute policies of benefit to the security of the Soviet Union. The Comintern was formally dissolved by Stalin in 1943 as a gesture of cooperation with the wartime allies, but the International Department was created to carry out its responsibilities. Another organization—the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)—was created in 1947 to carry out liaison and propaganda duties, and it included as members the communist parties of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. The Cominform expelled Yugoslavia as a member in June 1948 for ideological deviation. With the thaw in relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1955 and 1956, the Soviet Union formally dissolved the then-moribund Cominform as a gesture to the Yugoslavs.

The Cominform conflict with Yugoslavia in 1948 signaled the breakup of what in the West was perceived as "monolithic communism" and the emergence of "polycentrism." Polycentrism (literally, many centers), a Western term, describes the relative

independence from Soviet control of some nonruling and ruling communist parties. Polycentrism was further in evidence following the Sino-Soviet split that became evident in the late 1950s and early 1960s. More recently, some foreign communist parties have successfully resisted Soviet efforts to convene a conference of world communist and workers parties, the last of which occurred in 1969. The emergence in the early to mid-1970s of a broad and somewhat disparate set of ideological beliefs, termed "Eurocommunism," was further evidence of polycentric tendencies. Eurocommunist beliefs were espoused by nonruling communist parties in France, Italy, Spain, and elsewhere in the West that criticized Soviet attempts to assert ideological control over foreign communist parties and even denounced Soviet foreign and domestic policies.

Despite polycentric tendencies in the world communist movement, the Soviet Union was able to influence many parties through financial and propaganda support. This influence varied over time and according to the issue involved. The influence that the Soviet Union was able to exercise through the local nonruling communist parties was seldom significant enough to affect the policies of foreign governments directly. Local communist parties have reported on the local political situation to Moscow, have engaged in subversive activities of benefit to the Soviet Union, have served as conduits for Soviet propaganda, and have attempted to rally local populations and elites to support Soviet policies. During the late 1980s, the united front (see Glossary) strategy of alliances between nonruling communist parties and other leftist, "progressive," and even "petit bourgeois" parties received new emphasis. The goal was for communists to exercise influence through participation in electoral politics and through holding posts in legislatures and executive bodies. The global trend toward democratization was assessed by the Soviet Union as providing opportunities for the united front strategy. As was noted in *Pravda* in 1987, "The struggle for democracy is an important way of weakening monopolistic state capitalism, and the results of this struggle can be a starting point for the preparation of socialist transformation."

Soviet-United States Relations

A central concern of Soviet foreign and military policy since World War II, relations with the United States have gone through cycles of "cold" and "warm" periods. A crucial factor in Soviet-American relations has been the mutual nuclear threat (see The Soviet Union and Nuclear Arms Control, this ch.). A high point in Soviet-American relations occurred when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT—see Glossary) resulted in the May 1972

signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This event was an early achievement of Soviet-American détente.

The Soviet Union and the United States differed over the meaning of the détente relationship. In the West, détente has usually been considered to mean a nonhostile, even harmonious, relationship. The Soviet Union, however, has preferred the terms *mirnoe sosushchestvovanie* (peaceful coexistence) or *razriadka napriazhennosti* (a discharging or easing of tensions) instead of the term détente. Brezhnev explained the Soviet perception of the détente relationship at the 1976 and 1981 CPSU party congresses, asserting that détente did not mean that the Soviet Union would cease to support Third World national liberation movements or the world class struggle. In the Soviet view, détente with the West was compatible with sponsoring Cuban intervention in the Third World. However, Soviet-sponsored intervention in the Third World met with growing protest from the United States. The détente relationship conclusively ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Following the Soviet invasion, the United States instigated a number of trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, including an embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet Union, the cancellation of American participation in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and the shelving of efforts to win ratification in the United States Senate of the second SALT agreement. In April 1981, under the new administration of President Ronald Reagan, the United States announced the lifting of the grain embargo but also moved to tighten procedures concerning the export of strategically sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. As part of this effort to limit such exports, the Reagan administration in 1982 unsuccessfully attempted to convince West European governments to block the sale of American-developed technology for the construction of Soviet natural gas pipelines. A freeze on cultural exchanges that had developed after the invasion of Afghanistan continued during Reagan's first term in office.

The Soviet Union began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads along its western and southeastern borders in 1977. The United States and its NATO allies regarded this deployment as destabilizing to the nuclear balance in Europe, and in December 1979 NATO decided to counter with the deployment of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), both equipped with nuclear warheads. In November 1981, Reagan proposed the "zero option" as the solution to the nuclear imbalance

Embassy of the Soviet Union, Washington Courtesy Raymond E. Zickel

in Western Europe. Basically, the zero option included the elimination of SS-20s and other missiles targeted against Western Europe and the nondeployment of countervailing NATO weapons. The Soviet Union refused to accept the zero option and insisted that French and British nuclear forces be included in the reckoning of the balance of nuclear forces in Europe and in any agreement on reductions of nuclear forces. Feeling forced to match the Soviet nuclear threat, NATO began countervailing deployments in late 1983. As the deployment date neared, the Soviet Union threatened to deploy additional nuclear weapons targeted on Western Europe and weapons that would place the territory of the United States under threat. Also, Soviet negotiators walked out of talks on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces (the INF talks) and strategic forces (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START). The refusal to come back to the negotiating table continued after General Secretary Iurii V. Andropov's death and Konstantin V. Chernenko's selection as general secretary in early 1984. The Soviet Union finally agreed to resume the INF and START talks around the time of Chernenko's death and Gorbachev's selection as general secretary in March 1985. Progress was then made on the revamped INF talks. In 1987 the Soviet Union acceded to the zero option, which involved the elimination of NATO Pershing IIs and GLCMs targeted against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Soviet missiles targeted against Western Europe and

Asia. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was finally signed in Washington on December 8, 1987, during a summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev.

Between November 1982 and March 1985, the Soviet Union had four general secretaries (Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev) while the United States had a single chief executive. The changes of leadership in the Soviet Union had a noticeable effect on Soviet-American relations. Until Gorbachev assumed power and partially consolidated his rule by 1986, the frequent changes in Soviet leadership resulted in the continuation of policies formulated during the late Brezhnev period. Soviet foreign policy toward the United States during this period increasingly took the form of vituperative propaganda attacks on Reagan, who, it was alleged, was personally responsible for derailing Soviet-American détente and increasing the danger of nuclear war. The low point in Soviet-American relations occurred in March 1983, when Reagan described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire . . . the focus of evil in the modern world," and Soviet spokesmen responded by attacking Reagan's "bellicose, lunatic anticommunism." The Soviet shoot-down of a civilian South Korean airliner in September 1983 near the Soviet island of Sakhalin shocked world public opinion and militated against any improvement in Soviet-American relations at that time. In 1983 the United States was increasingly concerned about Soviet activities in Grenada, finally directing the military operation in October 1983 that was denounced by the Soviet Union. In November 1983, the Soviet negotiators walked out of the arms control talks.

In August 1985, Gorbachev declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The United States, in the midst of a nuclear warhead modernization program, refused to go along with the moratorium. Some Western analysts viewed Gorbachev's unilateral moratorium as a Soviet attempt to delay weapons modernization in the United States and, in the event that the United States refused to abide by the moratorium even unofficially, an attempt to depict the United States and the Reagan administration as militaristic. The Soviet Union ended the moratorium with an underground nuclear test in February 1987.

A general improvement in Soviet-American relations began soon after Gorbachev was selected general secretary in March 1985. Annual summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev were held at Geneva (November 1985); Reykjavik (October 1986); Washington (December 1987); and Moscow (May 1988). At the Geneva Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in November 1985, a new general cultural agreement was signed that involved exchanges of

performing arts groups and fine arts and educational exhibits. At the Reykjavik Summit, some progress was made in strategic arms reductions negotiations, although no agreements were reached. At the Washington Summit, the INF Treaty was signed. At the Moscow Summit, an agreement increasing the level and type of educational exchanges was signed. Although no major arms control agreements were signed during the Moscow summit, the summit was significant because it demonstrated a commitment by both sides to a renewed détente.

During the mid- to late 1980s, the Soviet Union also stepped up media contacts. Soviet spokesmen appeared regularly on United States television, United States journalists were allowed unprecedented access to report on everyday life in the Soviet Union, and video conferences (termed "tele-bridges") were held between various United States groups and selected Soviet citizens.

Soviet-West European Relations

Soviet relations with Western Europe since World War II have been heavily colored by Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and by the presence of Warsaw Pact forces arrayed against NATO forces. The Soviet influence over Eastern Europe, reinforced in West European eyes by Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and by the buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, fostered efforts in the 1980s among the West European states of NATO to bolster their defenses and discouraged closer relations between West European countries and the Soviet Union.

Since the end of World War II and the establishment of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union has had five goals in regard to Western Europe: preventing the rearming and nuclearization of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); preventing the political, economic, and military integration of Western Europe; obtaining West European endorsement of the territorial status quo in Europe; encouraging anti-Americanism and troubled relations with the United States; and fostering neutralism, nuclear disarmament, and the creation of nuclear weapons-free zones through the encouragement of peace groups and leftist movements. The Soviet Union has succeeded in achieving some of these goals but has been unsuccessful in achieving others.

In general, Soviet leaders have stated that the proper relationship between Western Europe and the Soviet Union should be similar to the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union. As stated by then-Politburo member Andropov in 1978, "Soviet-Finnish relations today constitute a sound and stable system of

enjoyment of equal rights of cooperation in the diverse areas of political, economic, and political life. This constitutes détente, as embodied in daily contacts, détente which makes peace stronger and the life of people better and calmer." More broadly, neutralism is extolled by the Soviet Union as a transitional historical model for Western and Third World states to follow in their relations with the Soviet Union, typified by nonparticipation in Western military alliances and economic organizations and by political support for anti-imperialism, capitalist disarmament, national liberation, and other foreign policies favored by the Soviet Union.

During the early to mid-1980s, Soviet leaders attempted to foster a "European détente" separate from détente with the United States. This attempt failed, however, because of the determination of West European governments to modernize NATO and deploy countervailing nuclear systems and the failure of Soviet-cultivated peace and other groups to influence West European policy.

France

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union cultivated a "privileged" relationship with France. The high point of Soviet-French relations occurred during the administration of President Charles de Gaulle (1959–69). Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Soviet-French relations cooled, although state visits continued. During the leadership of President François Mitterrand, first elected as part of a coalition government in May 1981, France pursued several policies objectionable to the Soviet Union, such as selling arms to China, militarily opposing Libya's invasion of Chad, working with West Germany to strengthen West European defense, and expelling a large number of Soviet diplomats and other personnel involved in technology theft and other forms of espionage. Gorbachev's first state visit as general secretary was to France in October 1985. The visit provided a public display of the Soviet Union's interest in maintaining a special relationship with France and also served as an attempt to exacerbate intra-European rivalries. Nevertheless, the general trend of French foreign policy in the late 1980s toward greater cooperation with NATO frustrated Soviet efforts to maintain a privileged relationship. France's refusal in 1986 and 1987 to discuss a freeze or a reduction of the French nuclear forces (*force de frappe,* or *force de dissuasion*) further strained Soviet-French relations.

West Germany

A recurrent theme in Soviet propaganda concerning West Germany has been the supposed resurgence of revanchism and

militarism, indicating to some degree real Soviet fears of a rearmed and nuclearized West Germany. The Soviet Union strongly opposed the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in Europe in the 1960s and demanded that West Germany sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which the Soviet Union had signed in July 1968. After Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party was elected chancellor in October 1969, he implemented a détente, termed *Ostpolitik* (literally, Eastern policy), with the Soviet Union. West Germany signed the nonproliferation treaty in November 1969. In August 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany signed a treaty calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes, with West Germany agreeing to respect the territorial integrity of the states of Europe and the validity of the Oder-Neisse line dividing East Germany from Poland. The provisions of this bilateral treaty became multilateral with the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Accords) in 1975, in which the Western signatories, including the United States, recognized the de facto hegemony of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and the existing territorial boundaries of the European states. The Helsinki Accords also bound the signatories to respect basic principles of human rights. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union began a harsh propaganda campaign accusing West Germany of revanchism and militarism because of West German initiation and support of NATO efforts to counter the Soviet deployment of SS-20s targeted on Western Europe. Gorbachev remained cool toward West Germany because of its role in fostering a NATO response to SS-20 deployments and delayed scheduling his first visit until June 1989. This visit was very successful in emphasizing Gorbachev's message of the "common European home" and the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union regarding Western Europe.

Britain

In the years immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet leadership assiduously pursued diplomatic relations with Britain, the archetypical "imperialist" power, as part of its efforts to win recognition as a legitimate regime. After World War II, the Soviet Union perceived Britain as an "imperialist power in decline," especially after Britain relinquished most of its colonies. Nevertheless, Britain remained an important power in Soviet eyes because of its nuclear forces, influential role as head of the British Commonwealth, and close ties with the United States.

In general, Soviet relations with Britain have never been as important a component of Soviet foreign policy toward Western Europe as have been relations with France (especially during the

de Gaulle period) or with West Germany (especially during the Brandt period). Several reasons for Britain's lesser importance existed. Unlike West Germany, Britain is not subject to Soviet political pressures exerted through the instrument of a divided people. Much smaller than its French counterpart, the British Communist Party exerted less influence in electoral politics. The British economy has also been less dependent than that of other West European states on Soviet and East European trade and energy resources.

In December 1984, shortly before Gorbachev became general secretary, he made his first visit to London. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that he was a leader she could "do business with," an assessment that boosted Gorbachev's stature in the Soviet Union and abroad. This assessment was repeated upon Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union in April 1987. Under Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviet Union renewed its attempts to persuade Britain and France to enter into strategic nuclear disarmament negotiations, which as of 1989 they had resisted.

Spain and Portugal

Soviet contacts with Spain and Portugal were almost nonexistent in the post-World War II period until the 1970s, when changes in leadership of both countries paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Portugal established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in June 1974, and Spain reestablished diplomatic ties in February 1977, broken in 1939 after the Nationalists defeated the Soviet-backed Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. Both countries have relatively large, long-established pro-Soviet communist parties, with the Portuguese Communist Party during the 1980s enjoying more electoral support and seats in the legislature. In March 1982, Spain joined NATO (Portugal was a founding member), a move opposed by the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Spain. Soviet relations with Spain during the 1980s were businesslike, with King Juan Carlos visiting Moscow in May 1984 and Prime Minister Felipe González visiting in May 1986. Relations with Portugal in the early 1980s were relatively poor, with Portugal criticizing the invasion of Afghanistan and other Soviet policies. Relations improved during the late 1980s, when President Mário Soares visited Moscow in November 1987 and signed trade and other cooperation agreements; Shevardnadze paid a return visit to Lisbon in March 1988.

Scandinavia

The central factor in Scandinavian relations with the Soviet Union is the proximity of Norway, Sweden, and Finland to major

Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula (see fig. 6). Besides Turkey, Norway is the only NATO country bordering the Soviet Union.

The interrelated Soviet objectives in Scandinavia have been to maintain freedom of navigation through the Baltic Sea into the North Sea, sustain the neutrality of Finland and Sweden, and encourage Norway, Denmark, and Iceland to withdraw from NATO. The Scandinavian states act to minimize the Soviet security threat through a mix of military preparedness and nonprovocative, accommodationist policies. Norway, Denmark, and Sweden do not allow the stationing of foreign troops, the establishment of foreign military bases, or the installation of nuclear weapons on their territory. Sweden's neutrality has been based on the concept of total national defense, which stresses involvement of the civilian population, as well as military forces, in defending territorial integrity. Since the 1970s, Sweden has been concerned about repeated Soviet submarine incursions into its territorial waters. Finland's "positive neutrality" is based on a special relationship with the Soviet Union codified in their 1948 Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Cooperation.

Soviet-East European Relations

Continued Soviet influence over the East European countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—remained a fundamental regional priority of Soviet foreign policy in mid-1989 (see Appendix B; Appendix C). The CPSU party program ratified at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986 designated these East European states as members of the "socialist commonwealth" (along with Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam) and depicted the establishment of socialism in Eastern Europe as a validation of "the general laws of socialism [communism]." By staking the validity of Marxist-Leninist ideology on the continuation of communism in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership in effect perceived attempts to repudiate communism as threats to the ideological validity of the Soviet system itself. The Soviet leadership expressed this sentiment in terms of the "irreversibility of the gains for socialism" in Eastern Europe. In the late 1980s, however, liberalization occurred, and the situation was tolerated by the Soviet leadership.

After the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended a process of liberalization begun by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union made clear the irreversibility of communism in Eastern Europe through statements that have come to be known in the West as the "Brezhnev Doctrine"

and are termed by the Soviet Union as "socialist internationalism." In a speech delivered in Poland in November 1968, Brezhnev stated, "When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system . . . this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries." The Brezhnev Doctrine was repeated in the 1986 party program's call for "mutual assistance in resolving the tasks of the building and defense of the new society," indicating no real change in this doctrine during the mid- to late 1980s. During his visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988, Gorbachev made statements that some Western observers termed the "repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine," signaling Soviet willingness to tolerate some political liberalization in Eastern Europe.

Soviet influence over Eastern Europe began with the Soviet occupation of territories during World War II. By 1948 communist regimes had come to power in all the East European states. In Yugoslavia, however, Josip Broz Tito, a nationalist communist who had played a major role in the resistance to the occupying German forces, opposed Joseph V. Stalin's attempts to assert control over Yugoslav domestic politics. Tito's actions resulted in Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 and the declaration of a trade embargo. In 1954, after Stalin's death, the Cominform ended its embargo. In May 1955, Nikita S. Khrushchev visited Belgrade and proclaimed the doctrine of "many roads to socialism," acknowledging Yugoslavia's right to a relatively independent domestic and foreign policy.

Leadership changes in the Soviet Union have often been followed by upheaval in Eastern Europe. Stalin's death created popular expectations of a relative relaxation of coercive controls. The slow pace of change contributed to domestic violence in three East European states—East Germany, Hungary, and Poland—within four years of Stalin's death in March 1953. In June 1953, the Soviet army peremptorily suppressed a wave of strikes and riots in East Germany over increased production quotas and police repression. In June 1956, four months after the Twentieth Party Congress at which Khrushchev delivered his "secret speech" denouncing Stalinist terror, anti-Soviet riots broke out in Poznań, Poland. In Hungary, anti-Soviet riots broke out in October 1956 and escalated immediately to full-scale revolt, with the Hungarians calling for full independence, the disbanding of the communist party, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union invaded Hungary on November 4, 1956, and Hungarian prime minister Imre Nagy was arrested and later executed. The events of the 1950s

taught the Soviet Union at least three lessons: that the policy of teaching the younger generation in Eastern Europe to support Soviet-imposed communism had failed; that Soviet military power and occupation forces were the main guarantees of the continued existence of East European communism; and that some limited local control over domestic political and economic policy had to be granted, including some freedom in the selection of leading party officials.

Czechoslovakia's 1968 liberalization, or "Prague Spring" (which occurred during a period of collective leadership in the Soviet Union while Brezhnev was still consolidating power), led to a Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968, illustrating that even gradual reforms were intolerable at that time to the Soviet Union. This lesson was illustrated again, but in a different form, during the events in Poland of 1980–81. The reforms sought by Polish workers—independent trade unions with the right to strike—were unacceptable to the Soviet Union, but for a variety of reasons the Soviet Union encouraged an "internal invasion" (use of Polish police and armed forces to quell disturbances) rather than occupation of the country by Soviet military forces. The new Polish prime minister and first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski, declared martial law on December 13, 1981, and banned the independent trade union movement Solidarity.

Gorbachev's political report to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February-March 1986 emphasized the "many roads to socialism" in Eastern Europe and called for cooperation, rather than uniformity, in Soviet-East European relations. The new party program ratified at the congress, however, reemphasized the need for tight Soviet control over Eastern Europe. Additionally, the five-year plan ratified at the congress called for integrated *perestroika* (see Glossary) among the Comecon countries, with each East European country specializing in the development and production of various high-technology goods under arrangements largely controlled by the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's emphasis on *perestroika* and *glasnost'* (see Glossary) domestically and within Eastern Europe was supported to varying degrees by the East European leaders in the mid- to late 1980s. The leaders of Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria apparently supported Gorbachev's reforms, while the leaders of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania resisted far-reaching reforms. Although there were varying degrees of compliance in Eastern Europe with Gorbachev's reform agenda, in the mid- to late 1980s the basic Soviet policy of maintaining a high level of influence in Eastern Europe had not been altered, although the nature of Soviet

influence apparently had shifted away from coercion toward political and economic instruments of influence.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Soviet relations with China have, on the whole, been cool since the 1950s. In 1959 and 1960, the Soviet withdrawal of all economic advisers, Khrushchev's renunciation of the agreement to provide a sample nuclear weapon to China, and increasing mutual accusations of ideological deviation were all evidence of the political rift between the two countries. After Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Brezhnev attempted to establish better relations with China, but his efforts foundered in the late 1960s. Riots by Chinese Red Guards in January-February 1967 led to the evacuation of nonessential Soviet diplomatic personnel from Beijing. In 1968 and 1969, serious Sino-Soviet border clashes occurred along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Beginning in the late 1960s, Brezhnev proposed an "Asian collective security system," which he envisioned as a means of containing China. This proposal, repeated by successive Soviet leaders, has been rejected by most Asian countries.

During the 1970s, China began its policy of improving relations with the West to counter Soviet political and military pressure in Asia. After Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, the Soviet Union sought to improve relations with China, but by early 1977 the polemics had renewed, and by mid-1978 increasing military tensions between Cambodia (China's ally) and Vietnam (the Soviet Union's ally) contributed to a return to poor relations. At the Eleventh National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in August 1977, CCP chairman Hua Guofeng declared that the Soviet Union represented a greater threat than the United States to world peace and Chinese national security. In keeping with this assessment, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed in August 1978, contained an "anti-hegemony clause" in which the signatories renounced the pursuit of hegemony and opposed the efforts of other states—implying the Soviet Union—to gain hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The Sino-American joint communiqué of December 1978 contained an analogous clause.

In February 1979, China launched a limited military incursion into Vietnam in retaliation for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, a Chinese ally. The Soviet Union harshly condemned this Chinese incursion and stepped up arms shipments to Vietnam.

In April 1979, China declared that it would not renew the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, but it offered to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union

to improve relations. These negotiations began in late September 1979 (separate border negotiations had been ongoing since 1969), with China demanding a cutback in Soviet troop strength along the border, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, an end to Soviet aid to Vietnam, and a Vietnamese military withdrawal from Cambodia. These negotiations were cut off by the Chinese in January 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the previous month. The Chinese thereafter added the demand that an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations required Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

At the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress in February 1981, Brezhnev reported that "unfortunately, there are no grounds yet to speak of any changes for the better in Beijing's foreign policy." Relations began to improve, however, after Brezhnev delivered a conciliatory speech at Tashkent in March 1982, and in October the Sino-Soviet border "consultations"—broken off after the invasion of Afghanistan—were reopened.

After Gorbachev became general secretary in March 1985, relations with China did not improve markedly at first. Nevertheless, high-level visits and discussions were encouraging enough that Gorbachev, at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February-March 1986, was able to "speak with satisfaction about a certain amount of improvement" in relations with China. In his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, Gorbachev promised to remove some of the obstacles to better Sino-Soviet relations, announcing that six Soviet regiments would be withdrawn from Afghanistan, that some troops would be withdrawn from Mongolia, that Soviet negotiators would discuss a reduction in Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and that the Soviet Union would commit itself to certain methodologies in delineating the Sino-Soviet borders. Another Soviet gesture was the removal of SS-20 missiles from the border with China as a result of the Soviet-American INF Treaty of December 1987. In April 1988, the Soviet Union signed accords calling for the total withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, which were a serious obstacle to better Sino-Soviet relations. During 1988 Vietnam committed itself to removing troops from Cambodia, overcoming another obstacle to improved relations and a summit. In 1987 and repeatedly in 1988, Gorbachev proposed a Sino-Soviet summit meeting, which was finally scheduled for June 1989. It was the first since the Khrushchev period.

Soviet-Japanese Relations

The poor relations between the Soviet Union and Japan can probably be said to have originated in Japan's victory over imperial

Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. During the Russian Civil War (1918–21), Japan (as a member of the Allied interventionist forces) occupied Vladivostok and did not leave until 1922. In the waning days of World War II, Stalin abrogated the 1941 neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union, declaring war on Japan days before Japan surrendered in August 1945 in order to occupy vast areas of East Asia formerly held by the Japanese. Fifty-six islands of the Kuril chain, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin, were subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union. The extreme southernmost islands of the Kuril chain constitute what the Japanese still term the Northern Territories—the small islands of Shikotan-tō, Kunashir, and Etorofu and the Habomai Islands. Stalin's absorption of the Northern Territories prevented the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese World War II peace treaty and the establishment of closer relations between the two states. The Soviet Union continued to refuse to return the Northern Territories because such a return would encourage the Chinese to push their own territorial claims. Also, the Soviet Union has used the islands as part of an antisubmarine warfare network guarding the mouth of the Sea of Okhotsk.

Under Gorbachev, Soviet-Japanese relations thawed somewhat. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Tokyo in January 1986 and December 1988, and a new Soviet ambassador, fluent in Japanese, was posted to Tokyo in mid-1986. As of 1989, however, political and economic relations had not shown signs of great improvement. Soviet trade with Japan remained far below its potential, given the Japanese need for energy and raw materials available from the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's desires to import technology to modernize the Soviet economy.

The Soviet Union and the Third World

Until Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet activity in the Third World was limited. Khrushchev recognized that the number of independent Third World states was increasing because of post-World War II decolonialization, and he pictured these states as moving onto the noncapitalist path of development and progressing quickly toward the achievement of Soviet-style socialism. Khrushchev divided the Third World states into three categories. The first category, capitalist-oriented states, mainly consisted of newly independent states that had not yet chosen the noncapitalist path. In the second category were the so-called national democracies, anti-Western states that were implementing some economic centralization and nationalization programs and hence had embarked on the path of noncapitalist development. In the third category were "revolutionary

democracies," which professed Marxism-Leninism as their ideology and had set up ruling communist-style parties (termed "Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties" by the Soviet Union). Since the late 1960s, the term "socialist orientation" has been increasingly used in the Soviet Union to describe Third World states on the non-capitalist path of development, although the states with ruling vanguard parties still have been termed revolutionary democracies.

Since the late 1970s, Soviet analysts have tended to regard the nature and future of the Third World either conservatively or pragmatically. On the one hand, conservative Soviet analysts have seen the Third World as making a choice between two paths—capitalism and socialism—and have maintained that only the latter path leads to political, social, and economic development. Pragmatic analysts, on the other hand, have seen the maintenance of some elements of capitalism as essential for the economic and political development of Third World countries. Among the pragmatic analysts, though, there have been different views about the pace of the transition to socialism in the Third World, with the more pessimistic theorists even suggesting the indefinite existence of mixed economies in Third World states.

The conservative theorists have tended to advocate the establishment of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties in Third World states, whereas the pragmatists have advocated a united front straegy in which the local communist and leftist parties ally with other "progressive" parties and groups and work to achieve change peacefully through elections and propaganda. Internal Soviet debates aside, the Soviet Union began to favor a dual policy toward the Third World in the 1970s, stressing the establishment of vanguard parties in some states and the united front policy in others. Rhetorically, and to some degree in action, though, Soviet leaders have placed greater emphasis on the united front policy in the late 1980s.

In the CPSU party program and in the political report delivered by Gorbachev in February 1986, there was a discernible de-emphasis on Soviet concern with socialist-oriented Third World states. The party program emphasized that "the practice of the Soviet Union's relations with the liberated countries has shown that there are also real grounds for cooperation with the young states that are traveling the capitalist road." According to some Western analysts, Gorbachev indicated the nature of this reorientation during his visit to India in November 1986. At that time, Gorbachev referred to Soviet relations with India as the model of the "new thinking" toward Third World states having a "capitalist orientation."

Reasons for this possible Soviet reorientation may have included desires to use technologies available in some of the "newly industrialized countries" for Soviet economic development, desires to foster positive trade flows and earn hard currency or access to desirable commodities, and attempts to encourage anti-Western foreign policies and closer alignment with the Soviet Union. As of the late 1980s, this possible reorientation did not include political-military abandonment of Asian communist states (Laos and Vietnam) or of "revolutionary democratic" or "progressive" regimes (such as Angola, Libya, Mozambique, or Nicaragua). The reorientation, rather, may have represented an attempt to widen the scope of Soviet interests in the Third World. As of 1989, the only case of possible Soviet "abandonment" of a so-called revolutionary democracy would be the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan, although the Soviet leaders hoped that they would be able to maintain some presence and influence in Kabul and in areas bordering the Soviet Union and in other enclaves.

Middle East and North Africa

Among the Third World regions, the Middle East was a central concern of Soviet foreign policy. The region borders the Soviet Union and therefore has a direct impact on national security. Also, various ethnic, religious, and language groups existing in the region are found also in Soviet border areas and thus constitute a possible threat to Soviet control. The Middle East is also of strategic concern because the Mediterranean Sea and Persian Gulf serve as waterways joining together Europe, Asia, and North Africa, and the region contains oil resources vital to Western industrial production.

In the post-World War II period, the main Soviet goal in the region has been to reduce British and, more recently, United States influence. Termination of the British colonial and protective role in the Middle East by the early 1970s created a military power vacuum in the region, which Iran sought unsuccessfully to fill with United States backing. In the late 1980s, however, the growing Soviet military presence in the region was underscored by the belated United States commitment to protect shipping in the Persian Gulf from Iranian attack, after the Soviet Union had already begun its own efforts to protect such shipping at the behest of the Kuwaitis.

Turkey

Soviet relations with Turkey were poor during the Stalin period because of Soviet territorial claims against Turkey. These claims helped induce Turkey to join NATO in 1952. Relations improved

during the 1950s and 1960s to the point where Khrushchev began giving economic assistance to Turkey in the early 1960s. During the 1980s, this economic assistance represented the largest program of Soviet aid to any noncommunist Third World state. Turkish relations with the Soviet Union further improved after the United States imposed an arms embargo on Turkey to protest the 1974 invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus. During the 1980s, Turkey continued a delicate balancing act between security cooperation within NATO and good relations with the Soviet Union.

Iran and Iraq

During the 1970s, the Soviet Union attempted to consolidate a closer relationship with Iraq while also maintaining normal relations with Iran. Soviet arms transfers to Iraq started in 1959 when, after Colonel Abd al Karim Qasim overthrew the pro-Western monarchy, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. These arms transfers continued during the 1960s and increased after the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972. The Soviet Union increased arms shipments to support Iraq's counterinsurgency efforts against the Kurds (whom the Soviet Union had earlier supported). Iraqi relations with the Soviet Union became strained in the late 1970s after discovery of an Iraqi communist party plot to overthrow the leadership and because the Soviet Union was backing Ethiopian attempts to suppress the Iraqi-supported Eritrean insurgency. Nevertheless, the Iraqi policy of acquiring Soviet arms and military equipment in exchange for oil was continued by Saddam Husayn, who succeeded to the presidency of Iraq in 1979. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, however, Saddam's government condemned the invasion, and Iraqi-Soviet relations deteriorated further. When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the Soviet Union halted arms shipments to Iraq, which drove Iraq to make desperate purchases in the private arms market. Relations thus became particularly strained between the Soviet Union and Iraq. Although normal relations between the two countries were resumed after 1982 when the arms shipments were renewed, Soviet efforts to draw Iraq into its political sphere of influence were not successful during the 1980s, and Iraq remained nonaligned.

The shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, responding to Iraq's military buildup and the irredentist ambitions of Iraq against Kuwait and Iran, himself concluded arms agreements with the Soviet Union in the mid- to late 1960s, while maintaining Iran's membership in the Western-oriented Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was formerly known as the Baghdad Pact. The

Soviet Union maintained cordial relations with the shah until the end of 1978, when the deteriorating security situation in Iran signaled the imminent collapse of the dynasty. The Soviet Union initially supported Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini after his return to Iran in February 1979 (he had been exiled in 1963). During the initial phases of the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet Union made overtures to Iran, but efforts to improve relations with Khomeini failed.

The hope of the Soviet Union had been to act as the broker of the Iran-Iraq conflict, much as it acted in the 1965 Indian-Pakistani conflict and as it attempted to do during the Somali-Ethiopian conflict of 1977–78. Although the cease-fire agreed to between the two belligerents in 1988 owed little to Soviet offices, the related Soviet goal of achieving close relations with both Iran and Iraq remained a component of Soviet foreign policy. The cease-fire benefited the Soviet Union in that it relieved the Soviet Union from protecting Iraq from military defeat, a defeat that would have demonstrated to the Arab world and to the Third World generally that Soviet leaders were insufficiently committed to states that had signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Other Middle Eastern States

Soviet relations with several Arab states improved during the mid- to late 1980s. In late 1985, Oman and the United Arab Emirates established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Relations also improved with Bahrain, Kuwait, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This Soviet policy of improving ties with Western-oriented Arab states, as well as with the radical regimes of Syria and South Yemen, indicated a shift in Soviet policy away from the forging of a radical bloc of states toward a more flexible diplomatic approach to Middle Eastern problems. A major objective of this more flexible Soviet policy was to achieve the convening of an Arab-Israeli conference in which the Soviet Union would act as the primary peace broker. The Soviet Union began pursuing this objective in the 1970s as part of its general effort to erode United States influence in the region.

Gorbachev pursued closer ties with several moderate Middle Eastern states—Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel—while maintaining ties with radical regimes such as those in Syria, Libya, and South Yemen. In May 1987, Kuwait sought Soviet protection of its shipping in the Persian Gulf, and the Soviet Union agreed to let Kuwait charter Soviet-flagged tankers to transport oil. The Soviet Union also increased the size of its naval task force in the Persian Gulf. For the first time since the expulsion of Soviet military

advisers in 1972 and the abrogation of the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976, a Soviet ambassador was posted to Cairo in 1985. Also, the Soviet Union agreed to reschedule Egypt's military debts on favorable terms. The Soviet Union agreed to provide Jordan with new weaponry, and Jordan's King Hussein announced his support for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East in which the Soviet Union would participate. This improvement in relations occurred despite Jordan's arrest of local communist party leaders in the spring of 1986. Lastly, the Soviet Union made several overtures to Israel in 1985–89 regarding reestablishment of diplomatic relations—severed in June 1967 as a result of the June 1967 War—in an attempt to gain Israeli support for an international conference on the Middle East. The Soviet Union had de-emphasized its previous condition that Israel withdraw from territories occupied during the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War before the reestablishment of relations, but the Israelis insisted on restoration of relations before the convening of the international conference. In 1987–88 the Soviet Union and Israel exchanged consular missions, but as of 1989 full diplomatic relations had not been restored.

Asia

The Soviet Union had at least four regional objectives in Asia: defense of the Soviet Union's eastern borders, including border areas claimed by Japan, China, and Mongolia; maintenance of Soviet alliances, as embodied in treaties of friendship and cooperation with India, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan; establishment of better relations with the Western-oriented, more economically advanced states in order to obtain technology and assistance in the economic development of Siberia; and, related to the other objectives, establishment of a pro-Soviet orientation among the states of the region that would have the effect of isolating China, South Korea, and the United States. The main instrument used in pursuit of these objectives has been the large Soviet military presence in Asia. Stressing that the Soviet Union is an Asian power, Gorbachev has attempted to establish or consolidate better relations with several states in the region, mainly China, Japan, and India. In 1988 Gorbachev had also attempted to remove Afghanistan as an issue blocking the establishment or consolidation of better relations with Asian states by negotiating a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces.

Afghanistan

Soviet involvement with Afghanistan goes back to the 1920s. In

1921, as a means to reduce British influence in the region and to get arms, Afghanistan signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. The treaty also called for Amanullah, the Afghan amir (ruler), to close his northern border. The border had been serving as a refuge for the Basmachi, Muslim insurgents opposed to the imposition of Soviet power in the khanate of Bukhara (now part of the Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Turkmen republics). In 1921 and 1931, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan signed treaties on neutrality and mutual nonaggression. Afghanistan, however, generally adhered in foreign policy to the principle of *bi-tarafi,* or a balanced relationship with great powers. In 1955 Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan abandoned this policy when he signed a military agreement with Czechoslovakia. In December of that year, during a visit to Afghanistan, Khrushchev signed an economic agreement and reaffirmed the 1931 Afghan-Soviet neutrality treaty. A major reason for the shift in Afghan policy was Daoud's interest in gaining support for his goal of absorbing Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province into Afghanistan.

In April 1978, Daoud was overthrown and executed by the radical People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), led by Hafizullah Amin and Nur Muhammad Taraki. Later that year Taraki, then president, went to Moscow and signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union that encompassed and revamped commitments contained in the 1921, 1926 (a trade agreement), and 1931 Soviet-Afghan treaties. In September 1979, Taraki was ousted by Amin, following an apparent attempt by Taraki himself to remove Amin. The Afghan populace became increasingly opposed to Amin's radical policies, and the security of the regime became endangered. Finding their position in Afghanistan imperiled, the Soviet leadership decided to invade the country in December 1979. Soviet troops or guards allegedly killed Amin and brought in Babrak Karmal (who had earlier fled to the Soviet Union during factional struggle within the PDPA) as the new secretary general of the PDPA. The invasion resulted in worldwide condemnation of the Soviet Union. The UN General Assembly, the Nonaligned Movement, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, NATO, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) all called for the withdrawal of "foreign" troops from Afghanistan. In June 1982, indirect talks began under UN auspices between the Afghan and Pakistani governments concerning resolution of the conflict. In May 1986, in an attempt to win Afghan support for the Soviet-installed regime, Karmal was replaced by Sayid Mohammad Najibullah as secretary general of the PDPA, and a campaign was intensified calling for "national reconciliation"

between the Soviet-supported regime and the Islamic resistance, the *mujahidin* (literally, holy warriors) and their supporters.

Gorbachev repeatedly termed Afghanistan a "bleeding wound," although he did not admit that the Soviet occupation and the Soviet-supported regime were opposed by the vast majority of Afghans. According to a United States Department of State estimate made in 1987, almost 1 million Afghans had been killed and more than 5 million had fled the country since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Partly in support of the "national reconciliation" process, Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech of July 1986 announced the withdrawal of a token number of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Despite talk of reconciliation, a major, but eventually unsuccessful, Soviet-Afghan army offensive against the *mujahidin* was launched in Paktia Province in mid-1987. At the December 1987 Soviet-United States summit meeting in Washington, Gorbachev proposed that the Soviet Union remove the 115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan on the condition that the United States first cease aid to the *mujahidin,* a proposal in accord with the Soviet contention that "imperialist" interference was the main reason for the initiation and continuation of the Soviet occupation. In April 1988, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed accords, with the United States and the Soviet Union acting as "guarantors," calling for the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan over a nine-month period beginning on May 15, 1988. The withdrawal was completed in early 1989.

India

A cordial relationship with India that began in the 1950s represented the most successful of the Soviet attempts to foster closer relations with Third World countries. The relationship began with a visit by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and Khrushchev's return trip to India in the fall of 1955. While in India, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union supported Indian sovereignty over the Kashmir region and over Portuguese coastal enclaves.

The Soviet relationship with India rankled the Chinese and contributed to Sino-Soviet enmity during the Khrushchev period. The Soviet Union declared its neutrality during the 1959 border dispute and the 1962 Sino-Indian war, although the Chinese strongly objected. The Soviet Union gave India substantial economic and military assistance during the Khrushchev period, and by 1960 India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. This disparity became another point of contention in Sino-Soviet relations. In 1962 the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to

coproduce the MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which the Soviet Union had earlier denied to China.

In 1965 the Soviet Union served successfully as peace broker between India and Pakistan after an Indian-Pakistani border war. The Soviet chairman of the Council of Ministers, Aleksei N. Kosygin, met with representatives of India and Pakistan and helped them negotiate an end to the military conflict over Kashmir.

In 1971 East Pakistan initiated an effort to secede from its union with West Pakistan. India supported the secession and, as a guarantee against possible Chinese entrance into the conflict on the side of West Pakistan, signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. In December, India entered the conflict and ensured the victory of the secessionists and the establishment of the new state of Bangladesh.

Relations between the Soviet Union and India did not suffer much during the rightist Janata Party's coalition government in the late 1970s, although India did move to establish better economic and military relations with Western countries. To counter these efforts by India to diversify its relations, the Soviet Union proffered additional weaponry and economic assistance. During the 1980s, despite the 1984 assassination by Sikh extremists of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the mainstay of cordial Indian-Soviet relations, India maintained a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Indicating the high priority of relations with the Soviet Union in Indian foreign policy, the new Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited the Soviet Union on his first state visit abroad in May 1985 and signed two long-term economic agreements with the Soviet Union. In turn, Gorbachev's first visit to a Third World state was his meeting with Gandhi in New Delhi in late 1986. Gorbachev unsuccessfully urged Gandhi to help the Soviet Union set up an Asian collective security system. Gorbachev's advocacy of this proposal, which had also been made by Brezhnev, was an indication of continuing Soviet interest in using close relations with India as a means of containing China. With the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1980s, containing China had less of a priority, but close relations with India remained important as an example of Gorbachev's new Third World policy.

Southeast Asia

Soviet goals in Southeast Asia included the containment of China, the introduction and maintenance of Soviet influence, and the reduction of United States influence in the region. As of 1989, the Soviet leaders had been only partially successful in attaining these

somewhat contradictory goals and policies. The Soviet acquiescence, if not support, for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in December 1978 resulted in the elimination of the pro-Chinese leadership of Cambodia. However, the Soviet posture regarding the occupation, along with the growing Soviet military presence in Vietnam, alarmed several ASEAN states and led to closer intra-ASEAN political, and even military, cooperation and to expanded ASEAN contacts with the United States and other Western countries. The Soviet Union also unsuccessfully urged the elimination of United States bases in the Philippines. However, the Soviet policy of improving ties with the Ferdinand Marcos regime in 1986 backfired when Marcos was forced from power.

A Soviet policy of stressing bilateral ties with individual ASEAN states, rather than multilateral relations, which would strengthen ASEAN as an organization, began to have some success in the late 1980s. After Gorbachev came to power, bilateral contacts with the ASEAN states increased as part of the Soviet leader's revised Third World policy, which emphasized relations with the newly industrialized countries, nonaligned states, and other capitalist-oriented states and improved contacts with Asian countries in general. In March 1987, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Australia and Indonesia as part of this reorientation, and in late 1988 he visited the Philippines. In July 1987, Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad of Malaysia visited Moscow, and in May 1988 Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand also visited.

The major Soviet success in Southeast Asia was the close political, economic, and military ties it established with Vietnam, which became a full member of Comecon in 1978. Although economic assistance to Vietnam was a heavy drain on the Soviet economy, Vietnam provided raw materials and thousands of laborers for work on Siberian development projects. Militarily, Cam Ranh Bay was the largest Soviet naval base outside the Soviet Union, allowing the Soviet Union to project increased power in the South China Sea. Politically, Vietnam aligned its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union, and Vietnam was considered by the Soviet Union as a "fraternal party state" and as part of the "commonwealth of socialist states."

In mid-1988 Vietnam announced the withdrawal by the end of 1988 of 50,000 of the 100,000 Vietnamese troops occupying Cambodia, with all troops to be withdrawn by 1990. This withdrawal, publicly endorsed if not implemented at the urging of the Soviet Union, allowed the Soviet Union to attempt to improve relations with the ASEAN states and China.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Although the Comintern previously had made low-level contacts with local communist parties, sub-Saharan Africa was an area of limited concern to the Soviet Union until Khrushchev's reassessment of the Third World in the mid-1950s. Although Khrushchev initiated economic "show projects" in several African countries, Soviet efforts to foster socialism in Africa foundered in the Congo in the early 1960s, in Guinea in 1961, and in Kenya in 1965 partly because the Soviet Union was unable to project military power effectively into Africa.

During the first few years of the Brezhnev period, the amount of economic assistance to Africa declined from the levels of the Khrushchev period, although it increased greatly in the mid-1970s. During the Brezhnev period, the Soviet ability to project power grew, enabling it to take advantage of several opportunities in Africa during the 1970s.

Because of the deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, economic assistance to Africa declined. Military assistance was maintained or increased in some instances in the face of insurgencies against so-called revolutionary democracies. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, all of which were fighting insurgencies, were major recipients of arms throughout the 1980s.

At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, Gorbachev called for a reorientation of relations with the Third World. He stressed the need to improve relations with the more developed, Western-oriented, Third World states while maintaining existing relations with other African states. In Africa the Soviet Union pursued closer relations with relatively more developed African states such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Gorbachev also reiterated Soviet support for the overthrow of the government of South Africa and support for the "frontline" states (states near or bordering South Africa) opposing South Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As part of a Soviet attempt to coordinate Soviet policy toward southern Africa, a new office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created to deal with the frontline states. In 1988-89 Soviet hostility toward the South African regime softened, and the two countries worked together diplomatically in resolving regional conflicts and issues such as negotiations over the independence of Namibia.

Angola

The Soviet Union engaged in a massive airlift of Cuban forces into Angola in 1975 to help the Popular Movement for the Liberation

of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) defeat rival groups attempting to achieve power after the Portuguese colonial administration ended. The rival group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA), continued to oppose the MPLA and by the early 1980s controlled almost one-half of Angola's territory and increasingly threatened the central government. In both 1985 and 1987, massive Soviet-directed and Cuban-assisted MPLA offensives were launched against UNITA in attempts to achieve a military solution to the insurgency. Both these offensives failed. In December 1988, regional accords were signed setting a timetable for Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The signatories were South Africa, Angola, and Cuba, with the United States acting as mediator and the Soviet Union as observer of the accords.

Ethiopia

In 1977 and 1978, the Soviet Union airlifted large numbers of Cuban troops into Ethiopia to help defeat an incursion by Somalia into the disputed Ogaden region. Somalia had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1974 and had received large amounts of Soviet arms. The Soviet leadership, however, ended this relationship in 1977 and switched support to Ethiopia because of Ethiopia's much greater population and economic resources and because of its location on the strait of Bab al Mandab, which links the Horn of Africa to inland Africa and the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union moved toward normalizing relations with Somalia but appeared to be waiting for a change in regime before attempting to greatly improve contacts.

Mozambique

In Mozambique the Soviet Union supplied arms to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente da Libertação de Moçambique—Frelimo) during its 1975 effort to win power, and in 1977 the Soviet Union and Mozambique signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. In 1977 a disaffected wing of Frelimo and other Mozambicans formed the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Movimento Nacional da Resistência de Moçambique—Renamo), which began increasingly successful military operations against the Frelimo government. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union stepped up military assistance to the Frelimo government in the face of the eroding security situation. The Frelimo government, because of inadequate Soviet military assistance, acted to

diversify suppliers by obtaining weaponry and military advisory assistance from Britain and Portugal, among others.

Central America and South America

Latin America, like sub-Saharan Africa, had been a relatively low priority in Soviet foreign policy, although in absolute terms interactions between the Soviet Union and Latin America had increased tremendously since the early 1960s. Until the Khrushchev period, Latin America was generally regarded as in the United States sphere of influence. The Soviet Union had little interest in importing Latin American raw materials or commodities, and most Latin American governments, traditionally anticommunist, had long resisted the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

A transformation of the Soviet attitude toward Latin America began in 1959 when Fidel Castro overthrew Cuba's long-time dictator, Fulgencio Batista. Castro gradually turned the island into a communist state and developed such close ties with the Soviet Union that Cuba was, by 1961, considered by the Soviet Union as its first "fraternal party state" in the Western Hemisphere.

Castro initially advocated armed revolutionary struggle in Latin America. However, after armed struggle failed to topple the government of Venezuela in 1965, the Soviet leadership stressed the "peaceful road to socialism." This path involved cooperation between communist and leftist movements in working for peaceful change and electoral victories. The "peaceful road" apparently bore fruit in 1970 with the election of Salvador Allende Gossens, the candidate of the leftist Popular Unity coalition, as president of Chile. Despite Allende's advocacy of close ties with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union was slow in providing economic assistance essential to the survival of the regime, and in the midst of economic collapse Allende died in a bloody coup in 1973. His ouster resulted in a partial renewal of Soviet support for Castro's position that armed force is necessary for the transition to communism. Brezhnev himself conceded at the 1976 Twenty-Fifth Party Congress that a "revolution must know how to defend itself." The Soviet Union funneled weaponry and economic assistance through Cuba to various insurgent groups and leftist governments in Latin America. The Soviet Union used Cuba as a conduit for military, economic, and technical assistance to Grenada from 1979 to 1983. The United States government claimed that guerrillas operating in El Salvador received extensive assistance from Nicaragua, Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya and that Nicaragua and Cuba funneled Soviet and East European matériel to the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Direct Soviet activities in South America have mostly involved diplomacy, trade, culture, and propaganda activities. Peru was the only South American state to purchase sizable quantities of military weaponry from the Soviet Union, and for many years about 125 Soviet military advisers were stationed there. Peru's military relationship with the Soviet Union began in 1968, when General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized power. In February 1969, Peru established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and one month after Allende's ouster in Chile in September 1973, the first Soviet weapons arrived in Peru. Major transfers occurred after 1976, when Peru received fighter-bombers, helicopters, jet fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and other relatively sophisticated weaponry. The Soviet Union had also been one of Peru's major trade partners, with some Peruvian exports being used to pay off Peruvian debt to the Soviet Union. Argentina in the 1980s was the Soviet Union's second largest trading partner among the noncommunist developing countries (India was the largest). In turn, the Soviet Union was a major importer of Argentine grain, meat, and wool.

Some Western analysts have posited a differentiated Soviet policy toward Latin America, which stresses military and subversive activities in Central America and diplomatic and economic (state-to-state) relations in South America. The range of instruments of influence used in Central America and South America, while varying in their mix over time, nevertheless indicated that all instruments, including support for subversive groups and arms shipments to amenable governments, had been used in Central America and South America in response to available opportunities, indicating shifting emphases but a basically undifferentiated policy toward Latin America. The main policy goal in Soviet relations with Latin America was to decrease United States influence in the region by encouraging the countries of the region either to develop close ties to the Soviet Union or to adopt a nonaligned, "anti-imperialist" foreign policy. The Soviet Union was cautious in pursuing this goal, seeking to maintain a low public profile in its relations, and was hesitant to devote major economic or military resources to countries in the region, with the exception of Cuba. As part of the reorientation of Soviet Third World policy toward better relations with Western-oriented Third World states, Gorbachev emphasized the establishment of better trade and political relations with several Latin American states. Evidence of this new emphasis was Gorbachev's visit to Cuba in April 1989 and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visits to Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in 1986–87. While in Cuba, Gorbachev and Castro signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, indicating continued Soviet support to Cuba.

The Soviet Union and Nuclear Arms Control

The Soviet Union has championed arms control, in the guise of its extreme variant—universal and complete disarmament—since the founding of the Soviet state. Lenin stated that worldwide disarmament could occur after the victory of socialism but that before that time it would be a tactical device to foster pacifism in the capitalist world.

The Soviet Union has proposed various nuclear disarmament plans since the development of nuclear weapons during World War II. In 1946 the Soviet Union rejected the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch Plan proposed by the United States (calling for international control of nuclear weapons) and counterproposed that all nuclear weapons be destroyed. The United States rejected this proposal because of lack of adequate verification provisions. The Soviet Union continued to push for total nuclear disarmament, launching the worldwide "Stockholm Appeal" propaganda campaign in 1950.

The Soviet Union did not seriously contemplate nuclear disarmament or arms reductions while it was in the process of developing and deploying nuclear weapons in the 1940s, 1950s, and most of the 1960s. During the early to mid-1960s, however, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to ban nuclear and other weapons from Antarctica and nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water (see Objectives in Space, ch. 17). Except for these tentative measures, during the 1960s the Soviet Union built up its strategic nuclear armaments. By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had reached a rough parity with the United States in some categories of strategic weaponry and at that time offered to negotiate limits on strategic nuclear weapons deployments. Also, the Soviet Union wished to constrain American deployment of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system and retain the ability to place multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on missiles (see Arms Control and Military Objectives, ch. 17).

The Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), initially delayed by the United States in protest of the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, began in November 1969 in Helsinki. The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Moscow in May 1972, froze existing levels of deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and regulated the growth of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As part of the SALT process, the Anti-Ballistic



President Ronald W. Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in Washington, December 1987
Courtesy Bill Fitz-Patrick

Missile Treaty was also signed, allowing two ABM deployment areas in each country (a protocol to the treaty later reduced the number of deployment areas to one).

The SALT agreements were generally considered in the West as having codified the concept of mutual assured destruction, or deterrence. Both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized their mutual vulnerability to massive destruction, no matter which state launched nuclear weapons first. A second SALT agreement was signed in June 1979 in Vienna. Among other provisions, it placed an aggregate ceiling on ICBM and SLBM launchers. The second SALT agreement was never ratified by the United States Senate, however, in large part because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Both the Soviet Union and the United States nonetheless pledged to abide by the provisions of the agreement. Follow-on talks, termed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), began in June 1982 but as of 1989 had not resulted in agreement.

In January 1986, Gorbachev announced a three-stage proposal for nuclear disarmament. His plan called for initial strategic nuclear weapons cuts of 50 percent and the banning of space-based defenses, followed by second- and third-stage cuts that would include

elimination of British and French nuclear arsenals. He also agreed to the United States position on the total elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe and indicated a new openness to consideration of wide-ranging verification procedures. Parts of the proposal were subsequently mentioned in Gorbachev's political report to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986. Although the proposal as a whole was rejected by the Western nuclear powers, elements of the proposal were included in the START negotiations and in the final round of the INF negotiations, which had begun in 1981.

In November 1981, the Reagan administration proposed the elimination of intermediate (1,000 to 5,500 kilometers) and shorter range (500 to 1,000 kilometers) ballistic and cruise missiles from Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union rejected this proposal and attempted to influence public opinion in Western Europe to prevent the NATO deployment of missiles that would counter the Soviet SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s targeted on Western Europe. According to some Western analysts, the Soviet Union hoped that through manipulation of European and American public opinion Western governments would be forced to cancel the deployments, a policy that the Soviet Union had successfully used in the late 1970s to force cancellation of NATO plans to deploy enhanced radiation warheads (neutron bombs). The Soviet Union walked out of the INF and other arms control negotiations in November 1983 as a result of the NATO deployment of countervailing intermediate-range nuclear forces. The Soviet Union returned to the INF negotiations around the time that Gorbachev became general secretary. Negotiations proceeded relatively quickly and resulted in the conclusion of the INF Treaty signed in Washington in December 1987. The INF Treaty called for the elimination of all American and Soviet INF and shorter-range nuclear forces from Europe and Asia within three years (see Soviet-United States Relations, this ch.). The treaty was ratified by the United States Senate and the Supreme Soviet in May 1988.

On December 7, 1988, Gorbachev made a major foreign policy speech to the UN General Assembly, announcing arms reductions that, if fully implemented, would reduce military tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. He pledged that the Soviet Union would unilaterally cut its armed forces by 500,000 troops over a two-year period and would significantly cut its deployments of conventional arms, including over 10,000 tanks. He also announced the withdrawal of six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary by 1991. In early 1989, Gorbachev also announced cuts in

the military budget, and several Warsaw Pact states also announced reductions in their armed forces and military budgets.

The Soviet Union and the United Nations

The Soviet Union has taken an active role in the UN and other major international and regional organizations. At the behest of the United States, the Soviet Union took a role in the establishment of the UN in 1945. The Soviet Union insisted that there be veto rights in the Security Council and that alterations in the Charter of the UN be unanimously approved by the five permanent members (Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States). A major watershed in Soviet UN policy occurred in January 1950, when Soviet representatives boycotted UN functions in support of the seating of China as a permanent member of the Security Council. In the absence of the Soviet representatives, the UN Security Council was able to vote for the intervention of UN military forces in what would become the Korean War. The Soviet Union subsequently returned to various UN bodies in August 1950. This return marked the beginning of a new policy of active participation in international and regional organizations.

For many years, the Western powers played a guiding role in UN deliberations, but by the 1960s many former colonies had been granted independence and had joined the UN. These states, which became the majority in the General Assembly and other bodies, were increasingly receptive to Soviet "anti-imperialist" appeals. By the 1970s, the UN deliberations had generally become increasingly hostile toward the West and toward the United States in particular, as evidenced by pro-Soviet and anti-United States voting trends in the General Assembly. Although the Soviet Union benefited from and encouraged these trends, it was not mainly responsible for them. Rather, the trends were largely a result of the growing debate over the redistribution of the world's wealth between the "have" and "have-not" states.

In general, the Soviet Union used the UN as a propaganda forum and encouraged pro-Soviet positions among the nonaligned countries. The Soviet Union did not, however, achieve total support in the UN for its foreign policy positions. The Soviet Union and Third World states often agreed that "imperialism" caused and continued to maintain the disparities in the world distribution of wealth. They disagreed, however, on the proper level of Soviet aid to the Third World, with the Soviet Union refusing to grant sizable aid for development. Also, the Soviet Union encountered opposition to its occupation of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and got little support (as evidenced

by Third World abstentions) for its 1987 proposal on the creation of a "Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security."

The Soviet Union in the late 1980s belonged to most of the specialized agencies of the UN. It resisted joining various agricultural, food, and humanitarian organizations of the UN because it eschewed multilateral food and humanitarian relief efforts. During 1986 Western media reported that East European and Asian communist countries allied with the Soviet Union received more development assistance from the UN than they and the Soviet Union contributed. This revelation belied communist states' rhetorical support in the UN for the establishment of a New International Economic Order for the transfer of wealth from the rich Northern Hemisphere to the poor Southern Hemisphere nations. Partly because of ongoing Third World criticism of the Soviet record of meager economic assistance to the Third World and of Soviet contributions to UN agencies, in September 1987 the Soviet Union announced that it would pay some portion of its arrears to the UN. This policy change also came at a time of financial hardship in the UN caused partly by the decision of the United States to withhold contributions pending cost-cutting efforts in the UN.

During the Gorbachev period, the Soviet Union made several suggestions for increasing UN involvement in the settlement of superpower and regional problems and conflicts. Although as of 1989 these suggestions had not been implemented, they constituted new initiatives in Soviet foreign policy and represented a break with the stolid, uncooperative nature of past Soviet foreign policy. While the basic character of Soviet foreign policy had not yet changed, the new flexibility in solving regional problems in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia, as well as problems in the superpower relationship, indicated a pragmatic commitment to the lessening of world tensions.

* * *

Information on Soviet ideology and general foreign policy orientations can be found in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron's *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy;* William Welch's *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy;* and William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani's *Untangling the Cold War.* Institutions and personnel involved in the formation and execution of Soviet foreign policy are discussed in Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann's *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World;* Seweryn Bialer's *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy;* Vernon S. Aspaturian's *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy;* and Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley's

Soviet Foreign Policy. Soviet foreign policy toward various regions of the world is treated in Robbin F. Laird's *Soviet Foreign Policy;* Richard F. Staar's *USSR Foreign Policies after Detente;* Seweryn Bialer's *The Soviet Paradox;* Adam B. Ulam's *Expansion and Coexistence, The Rivals,* and *Dangerous Relations;* and Alvin Z. Rubinstein's *Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II.* Regional focuses on the Third World include Jerry F. Hough's *The Struggle for the Third World;* Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama's *The Soviet Union and the Third World;* and Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby's *Soviet-Third World Relations.* Soviet foreign policy focusing on specific regions is analyzed in Christopher D. Jones's *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe;* Herbert J. Ellison's *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe;* Donald S. Zagoria's *Soviet Policy in East Asia;* Ray S. Cline, James Arnold Miller, and Roger E. Kanet's *Asia in Soviet Global Strategy;* Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer's *The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power;* Cole Blasier's *The Giant's Rival;* Alvin Z. Rubinstein's *Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan;* and Robert O. Freedman's *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East since 1970.* (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 11. Economic Structure and Policy



Economists discussing economic plans

THE SOVIET UNION OF THE 1980s had the largest centrally directed economy in the world. The regime established its economic priorities through central planning, a system under which administrative decisions rather than the market determined resource allocation and prices.

Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the country has grown from a largely underdeveloped peasant society with minimal industry to become the second largest industrial power in the world. According to Soviet statistics, the country's share in world industrial production grew from 4 percent to 20 percent between 1913 and 1980. Although many Western analysts considered these claims to be inflated, the Soviet achievement remained remarkable. Recovering from the calamitous events of World War II, the country's economy had maintained a continuous though uneven rate of growth. Living standards, although still modest for most inhabitants by Western standards, had improved, and Soviet citizens of the late 1980s had a measure of economic security.

Although these past achievements were impressive, in the mid-1980s Soviet leaders faced many problems. Since the 1970s, the growth rate had slowed substantially. Extensive economic development (see Glossary), based on vast inputs of materials and labor, was no longer possible; yet the productivity of Soviet assets remained low compared with other major industrialized countries. Product quality needed improvement. Soviet leaders faced a fundamental dilemma: the strong central controls that had traditionally guided economic development had failed to promote the creativity and productivity urgently needed in a highly developed, modern economy.

Conceding the weaknesses of their past approaches in solving new problems, the leaders of the late 1980s were seeking to mold a program of economic reform to galvanize the economy. The *Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986–1990 and for the Period to the Year 2000,* a report to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in March 1986, spoke of a "burden of the shortcomings that had been piling up over a long period," which required "radical changes, a profound restructuring." The leadership, headed by General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, was experimenting with solutions to economic problems with an openness (*glasnost*—see Glossary) never before seen in the history of the economy. One method for improving productivity appeared to be a

strengthening of the role of market forces. Yet reforms in which market forces assumed a greater role would signify a lessening of authority and control by the planning hierarchy.

Assessing developments in the economy, both past and present, remains difficult for Western observers. The country contains enormous economic and regional disparities. Yet analyzing statistical data broken down by region is a cumbersome process. Furthermore, Soviet statistics themselves may be of limited use to Western analysts because they are not directly comparable with those used in Western countries. The differing statistical concepts, valuations, and procedures used by communist and noncommunist economists make even the most basic data, such as the relative productivity of various sectors, difficult to assess. Most Western analysts, and some Soviet economists, doubt the accuracy of the published statistics, recognizing that the industrial growth figures tend to be inflated.

Economic Structure

The economy of the Soviet Union differs significantly from market economies; the country's massive and diverse economic resources are largely state owned. The central government controls directly or indirectly many aspects of the labor force, the retail and wholesale distribution system, and the financial system.

Nature of the National Economy

The Constitution of 1977 declares that the foundation of the economy is "socialist ownership of the means of production" (see The 1977 Constitution, ch. 8). The Constitution recognizes two forms of socialist ownership: state ownership, in which all members of society are said to participate, and various types of collective or cooperative ownership. According to Marxist-Leninist (see Glossary) theory, the former is more advanced, and the Constitution calls for its expansion. It is the most extensive form of ownership in the economy, incorporating all major industrial entities: the banking, transportation, and communication systems; a majority of trade and public services; and much of the agricultural sector. In the late 1980s, collective ownership was found primarily in agriculture, the small workshops of craftspeople, and some retail trade and services. In 1989 a law was passed allowing an increase in the number and kinds of cooperatives.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and, as an adjunct of it, the government set goals and chose priorities for the economy. Traditionally, the government has determined economic policy in considerable detail through its planning agencies

at various levels and has issued specific instructions to individual economic units concerning quantity and type of production expected of them, wage levels and incentive funds permitted, and, to a large extent, investment policies. Control of the economy has been exerted through a hierarchy of planning agencies that interact with appropriate government and party organs to devise and implement policy to achieve these goals. Various past reform efforts have altered the specific functions and assignments of the components of the economy, but the basic hierarchical structure has remained intact since its inception during the 1920s (see Planning Process, this ch.).

All-union (see Glossary) planning and control for each major sector of the economy is handled by relevant branch ministries, subordinate to the Council of Ministers and aided by a variety of planning agencies (see Administrative Organs, ch. 8). Between the ministries and the functioning enterprises (see Glossary), a variety of bodies, such as combines (see Glossary), trusts (see Glossary), and production associations (groups of formerly separate enterprises) join together entities representing aspects of production in a given area of the economy. On this level, periodic restructurings have been attempted to achieve greater efficiency (see Reforming the Planning System, this ch.).

In 1985 industry, composed of about 45,000 enterprises and production associations, accounted for 45.6 percent of net material product (see Glossary), according to official statistics. The agricultural sector, organized into collective farms (see Glossary) and state farms (see Glossary), produced 19.4 percent of net material product. Transportation and communications accounted for 10.7 percent, and the distribution system accounted for 18.2 percent (see Retail and Wholesale Distribution System, this ch.).

The 1977 Constitution permits individuals to be self-employed, with certain restrictions. Until the late 1980s, however, the authorities strongly discouraged the practice. Citizens may own personal property, such as a dwelling or an automobile, and may sell this property as "used" merchandise or bequeath it as they choose. They may also sell products they have themselves made. Traditionally, they have not been permitted to act as middlemen for profit or to hire the labor of other citizens for personal gain, i.e., to engage in private enterprise as it is understood in the West. Nevertheless, alongside the official economy a "second economy" has long flourished, made up of private individuals offering goods and services to consumers, who have traditionally been inadequately served by the state services sector. Such activities have included those that were simply private, illegal, or of questionable legality.

The existence of many illicit business activities, operating outside state controls, was freely admitted and deplored by authorities and the official press of the 1980s. Upon assuming power in March 1985, Gorbachev adopted a new approach to the problem. In a major departure from past policies, on May 1, 1987, it became legal for individuals to go into a variety of business activities on their own or in cooperation with others (see The Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 1986–90, this ch.).

Labor

In 1985 the Soviet work force totaled about 130.3 million persons. According to official statistics, almost 20 percent of these employees worked in agriculture and forestry, while slightly more than 38 percent worked in industry and construction. Just under 10 percent were employed in transportation and communications. As in other industrialized countries, the percentage of the total work force employed in distribution and other services had increased. The shift had been more gradual than in Western countries, however. In 1985 just under 32 percent of the work force was employed in distribution and other service jobs. Officially, the government did not acknowledge the existence of unemployment. However, Western analysts estimated that about 2 percent of the labor force might be unemployed at a given time, most of this being short-term unemployment.

The working-age population was officially defined as males from sixteen to fifty-nine years old and females from sixteen to fifty-four years old. As in other industrialized countries, the work force was gradually aging. Precise information concerning the number of pension-age workers employed either full time or part time was not available. However, Western analysts expected such workers to account for fully 12 percent of the labor force by the year 2000. A striking feature of the work force was the prominent role played by women, who accounted for some 49 percent of the work force in the mid-1980s.

The growth rate of the labor force had declined during plan periods in the 1970s and 1980s, and this situation was expected to improve only slightly during the 1990s (see Age and Sex Structure, ch. 3). Western analysts predicted that the work force would number just over 171 million persons by the year 2000. Population growth in general had slowed markedly in the European part of the country but remained high in the more rural Central Asian areas. This fact was a source of concern to economic planners because job skills were less plentiful in the non-European areas of the country. In view of the lower birth rates of recent decades and the aging of

People lining up for scarce consumer goods in a typical Soviet scene
Courtesy Jonathan Tetzlaff

the work force, leaders called for improvements in labor productivity through automation and mechanization of work processes and through elimination of surplus workers in enterprises. Leaders also expressed concern about the deficient education and training of many in the work force. Although the education system stressed vocational and technical training, and many industrial enterprises offered additional specialized training for workers after they joined the labor force, the economy suffered from a labor shortage, particularly for skilled personnel (see Pedagogy and Planning, ch. 6).

Labor was not directly allocated. Although compulsory labor, involving the transfer of entire groups of workers, had been a significant tool of industrial development during the dictatorship of Joseph V. Stalin (the precise extent of the practice has not been determined with certainty), its use had greatly diminished in subsequent years and by the 1970s was no longer a major factor in economic activity. The inhospitable terrain and remote location of many parts of the Soviet Union impeded the flow of skilled labor to areas targeted for development outside the western and southeastern areas of the country. Wage differentials, varying according to region, industry, and occupation, were used to attract employees to the tasks and locations for which there was a labor need. In large cities, where the presence of amenities and a variety

of economic activities attracted workers in excess of actual employment opportunities, residence permits were used to limit the influx of additional population.

Within the labor force as a whole, trade union membership was above 90 percent nationwide in the 1980s. Labor unions had a variety of functions: administering state social funds for the sick, disabled, and elderly and for day care; sponsoring vocational training and other educational services, such as libraries and clubs; and participating in aspects of enterprise management. Unions also acted as interpreters of party policy for the workers. Union leaders were expected to work to improve discipline and morale, educate the work force, and help to raise productivity. They did not bargain with management over wages or working conditions.

Retail and Wholesale Distribution System

In the mid-1980s, about 8 percent of the labor force worked in the distribution system. For the most part, internal trade took place in state retail outlets in urban areas and in cooperatives in rural areas. Prices in state and cooperative outlets were set by the State Committee on Prices and were determined by many considerations other than supply and demand. Both rural and urban inhabitants could also use "collective farm markets," where peasants, acting both individually and in groups representing collective farms, sold their produce directly to consumers. Here prices fluctuated according to supply and demand. Similar arrangements existed for nonedible products, although in a less developed form, as could be seen in a variety of secondhand stores and flea markets. Although such enterprises specialized in used items, they also sold new products, again on a supply-and-demand basis.

With regard to many types of consumer goods, the country's economy was "taut," that is, enterprises carried low inventories and reserves. Demand for good-quality items frequently exceeded supply. In effect, some goods and services, such as housing, were rationed as a result of their scarcity. In addition, a system of special stores existed for use by privileged individuals and foreigners. These stores could be found in major population centers but were not highly publicized. They contained good-quality items, both food and nonedible goods, in scarce supply. Moreover, a second economy had long flourished to supply consumer goods and services, such as repair work and health care, for which the official retail distribution system could not meet consumer demand. Observers expected that as a result of the reforms of the 1980s, a growing variety of goods and services would be distributed through the

expanding private sector of the economy (see The Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 1986–90, this ch.).

Distribution on the wholesale level took place largely through state-directed allocation, in conjunction with the planning process. Heavy industry, particularly producer goods, and the defense industry received highest priority. Reforms of the mid-1980s promised to decentralize this system somewhat, with users of materials free in many cases to make purchasing contracts with the suppliers of their choice. Western observers were uncertain as to the impact such an alteration would have on the supply system as a whole.

In 1984 per capita consumption was about one-third that of the United States. It was about half that of France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and roughly two-thirds that of Japan. Soviet levels of consumption were below those of some of the country's allies in Eastern Europe as well.

Financial System

The ruble, consisting of 100 kopeks, is the unit of currency. In the mid-1980s, the ruble (for value of the ruble—see Glossary) was a purely internal currency unit, and the government fixed its rate of exchange with foreign currencies somewhat arbitrarily. The State Bank (Gosudarstvennyi bank—Gosbank) issued currency and established its official gold content and thus its exchange rate with foreign currencies. The real value of the ruble for purchase of domestic consumer goods in comparison with the United States dollar was very difficult to determine because the Soviet price structure, traditionally established by the State Committee on Prices, differed from that of a market economy.

The banking system was owned and managed by the government. Gosbank was the central bank of the country and also its only commercial bank. It handled all significant banking transactions, including the issuing and control of currency and credit, management of the gold reserve, and oversight of all transactions among economic enterprises. Because it held enterprise accounts, the bank could monitor their financial performance. It had main offices in each union republic (see Glossary) and many smaller branches and savings banks throughout the country. The banking system also included the Foreign Economic Activity Bank and the All-Union Capital Investment Bank. The latter bank provided capital investment funds for all branches of the economy except agriculture, which was handled by Gosbank.

Because the banking system was highly centralized, it formed an integral part of the management of the economy. The Ministry of Finance had an important role to play in the economic system,

for it established financial plans to control the procurement and use of the country's financial resources. It managed the budget in accordance with the wishes of central planners. The budget had traditionally allocated most of the country's investment resources (see Tools of Control, this ch.). The reforms of the mid-1980s, however, required enterprises to rely to a greater extent on their own financial resources rather than on the central budget. These reforms also called for the creation of several new banks to finance industrial undertakings, ending the monopoly of Gosbank. Enterprises would seek and receive credit from a variety of banks.

Citizens could maintain personal savings accounts and, beginning in 1987, checking accounts. These accounts, initially limited to the Russian Republic, were offered by the newly formed Labor Savings and Consumer Credit Bank. Over the years, personal savings accounts had accumulated massive amounts of money, growing from 1.9 billion rubles in 1950 to 156.5 billion rubles in 1980. The savings represented excess purchasing power, probably the result of repressed inflation and shortages of quality consumer goods.

Economic Planning and Control

In the Soviet Union of the 1980s, the basic economic task of allocating scarce resources to competing objectives was accomplished primarily through a centrally directed planning apparatus rather than through the interplay of market forces. During the decades following the Bolshevik Revolution and especially under Stalin, a complex system of planning and control had developed, in which the state managed virtually all production activity. In the mid- and late 1980s, however, economic reforms sponsored by Gorbachev were introducing significant changes in the traditional system.

Planning Process

Economic planning, according to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, was a form of economic management by the state, indispensable both during the transition from capitalism to socialism (see Glossary) and in a socialist society. Soviet economic theorists maintained that planning was based on a profound knowledge and application of objective socialist economic laws and that it was independent of the personal will and desires of individuals. The most general of these laws, commonly referred to as the basic law of socialism, defined the aim of economic production as the fullest satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the population, using advanced technology to achieve continued growth and improvement of production. Centralized planning was presented

Interior of GUM, the government department store (completed in 1893), Red Square, Moscow. The largest department store in the Soviet Union, it serves as many as 350,000 customers each day.
Courtesy Jimmy Pritchard

by its proponents as the conscious application of economic laws to benefit the people through effective use of all natural resources and productive forces.

The regime established production targets and prices and allocated resources, codifying these decisions in a comprehensive plan or set of plans. Using CPSU directives concerning major economic goals, planning authorities formulated short-term and long-term plans for meeting specific targets in virtually all spheres of economic activity. These production plans were supplemented by comprehensive plans for the supply of materials, equipment, labor, and finances to the producing sector; for the procurement of agricultural products by the government; and for the distribution of food and manufactured products to the population. Economic plans had the force of law. Traditionally, they had been worked out down to the level of the individual economic enterprise, where they were reflected in a set of output goals and performance indicators that management was expected to maintain.

Operationally, short-range planning was the most important aspect of the planning process for production and resource allocation. Annual plans underlay the basic operation of the system. They covered one calendar year and encompassed the entire economy. Targets were set at the central level for the overall rate of growth of the economy, the volume and structure of the domestic product, the use of raw materials and labor and their distribution by sector and region, and the volume and structure of exports and imports. Annual plans were broken down into quarterly and monthly plans, which served as commands and blueprints for the day-to-day operation of industrial and other economic enterprises and organizations.

The five-year plan provided continuity and direction by integrating the yearly plans into a longer time frame. Although the five-year plan was duly enacted into law, it contained a series of guidelines rather than a set of direct orders. Periods covered by the five-year plans coincided with those covered by the party congresses (see Party Congress, ch. 7; table 30, Appendix A). At each congress, the party leadership presented the targets for the next five-year plan. Thus each plan had the approval of the most authoritative body of the country's leading political institution.

Long-term planning covered fifteen years or more. It delineated principal directions of economic development and specified the way the economy could meet the desired goals.

As in other areas of leadership, so in economic policy matters it was the Central Committee of the CPSU and, more specifically, its Politburo that set basic guidelines for planning (see Central Committee; Politburo, ch. 7). The planning apparatus of the government

was headed by the Council of Ministers and, under it, the State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyi planovyi komitet—Gosplan). This agency, made up of a large number of councils, commissions, governmental officials, and specialists, was assisted by the State Committee for Statistics (Gosudarstvennyi komitet po statistike—Goskomstat). It took plans developed by the city councils, republic legislatures, and regional conferences and incorporated them into a master plan for the nation. It also supervised the operation of all the plans. Gosplan combined the broad economic goals set forth by the Council of Ministers with data supplied by lower administrative levels regarding the current state of the economy in order to work out, through trial and error, a set of control figures. The plan stipulated the major aspects of economic activity in each economic sector and in each republic or region of the country. Gosplan was also responsible for ensuring a correct balance among the different branches of the economy, speeding the growth of the national income, and raising the level of efficiency in production.

The method used by Gosplan to achieve internally consistent plans, both in a sectoral and in a regional context, was called the system of material balances. No clear exposition of this method had been published. The system essentially consisted of preparing balance sheets in which available material, labor, and financial resources were listed as assets and plan requirements as liabilities. The task of planners was to balance resources and requirements to ensure that the necessary inputs were provided for the planned output. To reduce this task to manageable proportions, central authorities specified detailed output goals, investment projects, and supply plans for only key branches of the economy. The rest of the plan was developed only to the extent needed to ensure achievement of the main goals.

Among operational organizations participating in the planning process, a major role belonged to the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply. This agency shared with Gosplan the controls over the allocation of essential materials and equipment. Other operational agencies included the State Committee for Construction, which played an important part in industrial investment planning and housing construction; the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems; and the State Committee for Science and Technology, which prepared proposals for the introduction of new technology. Finally, the Academy of Sciences (see Glossary) helped to develop a scientific basis for optimal planning and accounting methods.

When the control figures had been established by Gosplan, economic ministries drafted plans within their jurisdictions and directed the planning by subordinate enterprises. The control figures were sent in disaggregated form downward through the planning hierarchy to production and industrial associations (various groupings of related enterprises) or the territorial production complex (see Glossary) for progressively more detailed elaboration. Individual enterprises at the base of the planning pyramid were called upon to develop the most detailed plans covering all aspects of their operations. In agriculture, individual collective farms and state farms worked under the supervision of local party committees. The role of the farms in planning, however, was more circumscribed.

At this point, as the individual enterprise formulated its detailed draft production plans, the flow of information was reversed. Rank-and-file workers as well as managers could participate in the planning process on the enterprise level; according to Soviet reports, approximately 110 million citizens took part in discussions of the draft guidelines for the 1986–90 period and long-term planning for the 1986–2000 period. The draft plans of the enterprises were sent back up through the planning hierarchy for review, adjustment, and integration. This process entailed intensive bargaining, with top authorities pressing for maximum and, at times, unrealizable targets and enterprises seeking assignments that they could reasonably expect to fulfill or even overfulfill. Ultimate review and revision of the draft plans by Gosplan and approval of a final all-union plan by the Council of Ministers, the CPSU, and the Supreme Soviet were followed by another downward flow of information, this time with amended and approved plans containing specific targets for each economic entity to the level of the enterprise.

A parallel system for planning existed in each union republic and each autonomous republic (see Glossary). The state planning committees in the union republics were subject to the jurisdiction of both the councils of ministers in the union republics and Gosplan. They drafted plans for all enterprises under the jurisdiction of the union republics and recommended plans for enterprises subordinated to union-republic ministries (see Glossary) and located on their territory. The regional system also included planning agencies created for several major economic regions, which were responsible either to Gosplan or to a state planning committee in a union republic. Autonomous republics had planning systems similar to those of union republics.

Advocates of the centrally planned economy (CPE) argued that it had four important advantages. First, the regime could harness the economy to serve its political and economic objectives.

Gas station between Moscow and Smolensk, Russian Republic
Courtesy Jonathan Tetzlaff

Satisfaction of consumer demand, for example, could be limited in favor of greater investment in basic industry or channeled into desired patterns, e.g., reliance on public transportation rather than on private automobiles. Centralized management could take into account long-term needs for development and disregard consumer desires for items that it considered frivolous. With a centralized system, it was possible to implement programs for the common good, such as pollution controls, construction of industrial infrastructure, and preservation of parkland. Second, in theory CPEs could make continuous, optimal use of all available resources, both human and material. Neither unemployment nor idle plant capacity would exist beyond minimal levels, and the economy would develop in a stable manner, unimpeded by inflation or recession. Industry would benefit from economies of scale and avoid duplication of capacity. Third, CPEs could serve social rather than individual ends; under such a system, the leadership could distribute rewards, whether wages or perquisites, according to the social value of the service performed, not according to the vagaries of supply and demand on an open market. Finally, proponents argued that abolition of most forms of property income, coupled with public ownership of the means of production, promoted work attitudes that enhanced team effort and conscientious attention to tasks at

hand; laborers could feel that they were working for their own benefit and would not need strict disciplinary supervision.

Critics of CPEs identified several characteristic problems. First, because economic processes were so complex, the plan had to be a simplification of reality. Individuals and producing units could be given directives or targets, but in executing the plan they might select courses of action that conflicted with the overall interests of society as determined by the planners. Such courses of action might include, for example, ignoring quality standards, producing an improper product mix, or using resources wastefully.

Second, critics contended that CPEs had built-in obstacles to innovation and efficiency in production. No appropriate mechanism existed to ensure the prompt, effective transfer of new technical advances to actual practice in enterprises. Managers of producing units, frequently having limited discretionary authority, saw as their first priority a strict fulfillment of the plan targets rather than the application of the insights gained through research and development or the diversification of products. Plant managers might be reluctant to shut down their production lines for modernization because the attendant delays could jeopardize the fulfillment of targets.

Third, CPEs were said to lack a system of appropriate incentives to encourage higher productivity by managers and workers. Future mandatory targets were frequently based on past performance. Planners often established targets for the next plan period by adding a certain percentage to the achieved output while reducing authorized inputs to force greater productivity (sometimes called the "ratchet" system by Western analysts). The ratchet system discouraged enterprises from revealing their full potential. Managers actually might be reluctant to report exceptional levels of output.

Fourth, the system of allocating goods and services in CPEs was inefficient. Most of the total mix of products was distributed according to the plan, with the aid of the system of material balances. But because no one could predict perfectly the actual needs of each production unit, some units received too many goods and others too few. The managers with surpluses, either in materials or in human resources, were hesitant to admit they had them, for CPEs were typically "taut." Managers preferred to hoard whatever they had and then to make informal trades for materials they needed. The scarcity of supplies resulting from a taut economy and the unpredictability of their availability were persistent problems for enterprises, forcing them to adopt erratic work schedules such as "storming." This was a phenomenon whereby many enterprises fulfilled a major portion of their monthly plan through frenzied

activity during the final third of the month, by which time they had mustered the necessary supplies. The uncertainty of supply was also responsible for a general tendency among industrial ministries to become self-sufficient by developing their own internal supply bases and to give priority to the needs of enterprises under their own jurisdiction over the requirements, even though more urgent, of enterprises in other ministries (a practice sometimes referred to as "departmentalism").

Finally, detractors argued that in CPEs prices did not reflect the value of available resources, goods, or services. In market economies, prices, which are based on cost and utility considerations, permit the determination of value, even if imperfectly. In CPEs, prices were determined administratively, and the criteria the government used to establish them sometimes bore little relation to costs. The influence of consumers was weak (the exception being the Ministry of Defense, which was in a position to make explicit demands of its suppliers). Prices often varied significantly from the actual social or economic value of the products for which they had been set and were not a valid basis for comparing the relative value of two or more products. The system's almost total insulation from foreign trade competition exacerbated this problem (see Development of the State Monopoly on Foreign Trade, ch. 15).

Reforming the Planning System

Soviet economists and planners have long been aware of the alleged strengths and weaknesses of the centralized planning system. Numerous changes in the structure, scope of responsibilities, and authority of the various planning and administrative organizations have been made over the years. Nevertheless, the fundamental planning process remained virtually unchanged after the inception of full-scale central planning in 1928 until the late 1980s, when some radical changes were discussed.

In the decades that followed its introduction, the planning process became increasingly complex and detailed. Planners specified not only quantitative production of goods but also their cost, how they would be distributed, and what resources in labor, materials, and energy they would require. The complexity of the apparatus administering the plans also increased. Ministries (called people's commissariats until 1946) proliferated, reaching fifty by 1957 and reflecting the increasing variety of industrial production. By 1982 the number of ministries, state committees, and other important committees at the all-union level approached 100. Planning had become immensely complex; in the 1980s planners had to contend with more than 20 million types, varieties, and sizes of products,

which were produced by 45,000 industrial, 60,000 agricultural, and 33,000 construction enterprises.

Western analysts have viewed reform attempts of Soviet leaders prior to the late 1980s as mere tinkering. From 1957 to 1965, however, a radical change was made, when Nikita S. Khrushchev sponsored a shift from the predominantly sectoral approach to a regional system (see The Khrushchev Era, ch. 2). The reform abolished most industrial ministries and transferred planning and administrative authority to about 100 newly created regional economic councils. The regime hoped to end unsatisfactory coordination among the industrial ministries and ineffective regional planning. Khrushchev apparently hoped to end the traditional concentration of administrative power in Moscow, reduce departmentalism, and make more efficient use of specific economic resources of the various regions. Other changes under Khrushchev included extension of the usual five-year cycle to seven years, from 1959 to 1965, which was subsequently reduced to five years. When the regional system proved to be even less effective than the organizational structure it had replaced, and the weaknesses of the ministerial system reappeared in a regional context, Khrushchev sponsored an additional series of minor changes. But in 1965, after Leonid I. Brezhnev and Aleksei N. Kosygin had replaced Khrushchev as head of party and head of government, respectively, the regime abolished the regional economic councils and reinstituted the industrial ministerial system, although with greater participation of regional bodies in the planning process, at least in theory.

Several reforms of the mid- and late 1960s represented efforts to decentralize decision-making processes, transferring some authority from central planning authorities and ministries to lower-level entities and enterprises. A series of minor reforms in 1965 modified the incentive system by shifting emphasis from gross output to sales and profits, a reform associated with the name of the eminent economist Evsei Liberman. The reforms attempted to provide a more precise measure of labor and materials productivity. They also granted enterprise managers slightly greater latitude in making operating decisions by reducing the number of plan indicators assigned by higher authorities. In addition, the reforms introduced charges for interest and rent. Attention focused particularly on experiments with *khozraschet* (see Glossary), which, in the late 1980s, required enterprises to cover many expenses from their own revenues, thereby encouraging efficient use of resources. In the agricultural sector, state farms and collective farms received greater latitude in organizing their work activities and in establishing subsidiary industrial enterprises such as canning and food processing,

timber and textile production, production of building materials, and actual construction projects.

In practice, the amount of decentralization involved in the reforms of the mid-1960s was minimal. For a variety of reasons, including uneasiness about the unrest associated with reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1967 and 1968, planning officials judged the reforms to be failures. By the early 1970s, efforts at further reforms had ceased, although the government never repealed the new regulations. As the only noteworthy, lasting change, the government began to use measures of net output rather than gross output as a success indicator for enterprises.

During the last years of Brezhnev's rule, the leadership remained relatively complacent about the system despite the economy's slowing growth rates. Increases in world oil and gold prices contributed to this attitude because they enhanced hard-currency (see Glossary) purchasing power in the early 1970s and made it possible to import increasing amounts of Western technology.

In response to the stagnation of the late Brezhnev era, a new reform attempt began under Iurii V. Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary in 1982. On an experimental basis, the government gave a number of enterprises greater flexibility in the use of their profits either for investment purposes or for worker incentives. The experiment was formally expanded to include all of the industrial sector on January 1, 1987, although by that time its limited nature and modest prospects for success had been widely recognized.

In the meantime, however, Gorbachev, a leading proponent of both these reforms and more extensive changes, was making his influence felt, first as adviser on economic policy under Andropov and his successor, Konstantin U. Chernenko, and then as general secretary beginning in 1985. Some of Gorbachev's early initiatives involved mere reorganization, similar to previous reform efforts. For example, from 1985 to 1987 seven industrial complexes—organs that were responsible directly to the Council of Ministers and that monitored groups of related activities—were established: agro-industrial, chemicals and timber, construction, fuel and energy, machine building, light industry, and metallurgy (see The Complexes and the Ministries, ch. 12). The ministries remained reluctant to undertake more extensive reforms that would reduce their centralized power and give greater initiative to lower-level economic units. But the conviction was growing that the centralized planning mechanism needed major changes and that simply fine-tuning the economy with minor reforms would not be sufficient.

At Gorbachev's urging, on June 30, 1987, the Supreme Soviet approved a set of measures contained in the *Basic Provisions for Fundamentally Reorganizing Economic Management.* The Supreme Soviet subsequently adopted an additional ten decrees, as well as the Law on State Enterprises (Associations). Taken as a whole, the actions of the Supreme Soviet signaled a substantial change in the system of centralized planning, with significant amounts of authority devolving upon middle and lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. Gorbachev named the economic restructuring program *perestroika* (see Glossary).

The *Basic Provisions* clearly stated that the economy would continue to function as "a unified national economic complex," carrying out the policies of the party. The regime obviously intended to retain great influence in the management and development of enterprises. The new measures also called for a redefinition and curtailment of the role of Gosplan. Beginning in 1991, Gosplan would no longer draw up annual plans. It would continue to develop five- and fifteen-year plans, specify state orders (involving about 25 percent of total output), and determine material balances for products considered to be critically important to the economy and national defense. Gosplan's development of "non-binding control figures" would suggest overall output, profit targets, and various indicators of technical and social progress. Long-term norms would regulate ongoing development, such as total wage payments and payments to various state-sponsored funds, for example, bonus funds, resources for social services, and research and development resources. Once enterprises had filled the designated state orders, however, they would have considerable freedom in deciding what to produce with the remainder of their resources and how to dispose of the products.

The new Law on State Enterprises (Associations) called for *khozraschet.* By the end of 1989, all enterprises in the economy were to make the transition to self-financing (*samofinansirovanie*—see Glossary), taking full responsibility for the financial outcome of their actions. The state budget would pay only for major investment projects. A principal criterion for judging enterprise and management performance would be the fulfillment of contracts. Enterprises would be free to reduce the size of their work force or to dismiss workers for poor performance. The law also provided for the bankruptcy and dissolution of enterprises that consistently operated at a loss. Their workers would receive severance pay and assistance in job placement from the state. In addition, the law called for the election of management personnel in enterprises, subject to approval by the next-higher authority. Finally, the law called for the election

of labor councils to resolve matters of pay, discipline, training, and use of incentive funds. Only one-fourth of the membership could represent the interests of management, and the councils' decisions would be binding on the entire work force of the enterprise.

The reforms attempted to decentralize distribution. The law enabled enterprises to deal with the suppliers of their choice, either producers or wholesale outlets. Rationing would continue for only the scarcest producer goods, less than 4 percent of total industrial output in 1988. For the remainder, producers would be free to sell directly to users. Finally, the law permitted some enterprises to engage in foreign trade directly, on their own account, and to retain some of the foreign currency gains.

Tools of Control

By the 1980s, the planning system had become extremely complex. Maintaining control over plan implementation was a difficult task. The same administrative structure undertook both the planning itself and the oversight of plan fulfillment. The banking system, party units within lower-level organizations and enterprises, and any workers willing to take responsibility for bringing to light failings within their organizations provided assistance. Labor union activists also helped supervise performance at the enterprise level and solicited support for plan fulfillment.

In addition to exercising this direct control, planners and policy makers used the budget to influence the economy. The bulk of the revenues for the budget came from levies on the profits of enterprises and from an indirect tax on consumer goods. These tax levies could be readily altered to support changing plan priorities, particularly because the government produced no long-term budgets, only yearly ones. The regime distributed budget funds according to priorities that reflected the goals of the economic plans. Unlike state budgets in the West, the Soviet budget had a consolidated format for all levels of the government. Traditionally, the budget also had included most of the investment activity carried on within the economy. Reforms of the 1980s promised to alter the situation somewhat, however; the Law on State Enterprises (Associations) called upon enterprises to use their own profits as major sources of investment (see Reforming the Planning System, this ch.).

According to official Soviet sources, primary expenditures in the 1985 budget were grants for economic purposes (56 percent of the budget); funds for social and cultural services (32.5 percent); defense spending (4.9 percent); and administrative costs (0.8 percent). A small surplus remained (typical of Soviet budgets, according to published data). Western analysts considered these statistics unreliable;

most Western observers believed the defense budget's share was far greater than official figures suggested. Furthermore, Soviet definitions of various economic measurements differed markedly from Western concepts (for example, the use of net material product to measure output).

The government's pricing policy acted as another control mechanism. These prices provided a basis for calculating expenses and receipts, making possible assessment of outputs. The regime also used manipulation of prices to achieve certain social goals, such as encouragement of public transportation or dissemination of cultural values through low-priced books, journals, and recreational and cultural events.

Over the years, this centralized system had produced prices with little relationship either to the real costs of the products or to their price on the world market. For several decades, the government kept the price of basic goods, such as essential foods, housing, and transportation, artificially low, regardless of actual production costs. As agricultural costs had increased, for example, subsidies to the agricultural sector had grown, but retail prices remained stable. Only prices for luxury goods had risen, particularly during the price overhauls of 1965 and 1982.

The *Basic Provisions* passed by the Supreme Soviet called for thorough reform of the price structure by 1990, in time for use in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (1991–95). This price reform was more extensive than previous reforms, affecting both wholesale and retail prices. In the future, central authorities would establish far fewer prices, although all prices would still be closely monitored. Plans for reform provoked public controversy because the changes would end subsidies for many common items, such as meat, milk, fuel, and housing. Authorities promised a thorough public discussion of retail price changes and gave assurances that the living standards of workers would not decline.

Like prices, wages were a flexible tool by means of which the government influenced the economic scene. Until 1931 the regime attempted to enforce an egalitarian wage structure. Policy concerning wage differentials had fluctuated in later years, however. In some periods, ideology and egalitarianism were emphasized, whereas at other times the government used rewards and incentives. Beginning in 1956, when it established a minimum wage, the government made a concerted effort to improve the wages of those in the lower-paid categories of work and to lessen differences among workers. With the reforms of the 1980s, however, wage differentials were again increasing, with high-quality technical, executive, and professional skills being favored in the wage structure.